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I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial efforts to reconcile the advantages of arbitration with
the protection of disputing parties' legal rights have pursued a me-
andering, if not tortuous, path. The courts' labors in this field re-
semble the biological process known as "morphallaxis.
This article discusses judicial morphallaxis in the sense that
the entire field of arbitration has been organized and reorganized
with limited consistency or concern for future ramifications or
precedent. Each area of arbitration has pursued its own unique
meandering path towards its current state of being.2 This article
examines the past, present, and future direction of arbitration, in
addition to proposing a united and uniform code of arbitration
categorized into various types.
There have been challenges to the policy and practice of pri-
vate adjudication from the earliest days of the English courts' dis-
approval of private arbitration as "ousting" them of jurisdiction, to
the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act' and state legislative
variants of the Uniform Arbitration Act.4 Examining arbitration
1. The AMERICAN HERITAGE DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1175 (3d
ed. 1992) (defining "morphallaxis" as "[t] he regeneration of a body part by means
of structural or cellular reorganization with only limited production of new cells,
observed primarily in invertebrate organisms, such as certain lobsters.") In com-
parison with the biological metaphor, each new arbitration "rule" or "test" can be
viewed as a sort of legal "mutant." One definition of a "mutant" is "[a]n indi-
vidual, an organism, or a new genetic character arising or resulting from muta-
tion." Id. at 1192. "Mutation" is also defined as: "1. The act or process of being
altered or changed. 2. An alteration or change, as in nature, form, or quality. 3.
Genetics. A sudden structural change within a gene or chromosome of an organ-
ism resulting in the creation of a new character or trait not found in the parental
type." Id.
2. See Agar v. McKlew, 57 Eng. Rep. 405, 407 (1825) (holding specific per-
formance will not be employed to support an arbitration clause); see also Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 259, 271-75 (1990) (discussing the history of judicial hostility towards arbitra-
tion).
3. In 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act (hereinafter "FAA") was established
out of ajudicial environment that did not appreciate arbitration. The purpose of
the FAA was "to place an arbitration agreement 'upon the same footing as other
contracts, where it belongs.'" Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,
219 (1985) (citing H. R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., (1924)). In Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., the United States Supreme Court stated Congress passed the FAA
.to overrule the judiciary's long-standing refusal to enforce agreements to arbi-
trate." Id. at 219-20.
4. Currently, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have adopted
arbitration statutes based on the Uniform Arbitration Act, (hereinafter "UAA").
[Vol. 24
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from this array of perspectives, courts have struggled, to no great
avail, to create a sort of 'Grand Unified Theory of the Law of Arbi-
tration.'" Differences in the respective adjudicative mechanisms
have forced arbitration principles back into the courts for reevalua-
tion. Courts have examined whether an agreement to arbitrate was
a product of a "knowing waiver" of a party's right to proceed in
6court. They have also considered the enforceability of agreementsto arbitrate as "contracts of adhesion,"' and scrutinized the fun-
Jurisdictions that have adopted arbitration statutes based on the UAA include
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. Section 1 of the
U.A.A. establishes the validity of arbitration agreements by stating:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or
a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy
thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevoca-
ble, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 1, 7 U.L.A. 6-7 (1997).
5. By a "Grand Unified Theory of the Law of Arbitration," we mean a co-
herent body of principles that are universally applicable regardless of the subject
matter of the underlying dispute. See Sternlight, infra note 12.
6. The United States Supreme Court indicated that an employee could not
forfeit substantive rights under Title VII absent a voluntary and "knowing waiver."
Alexander v. Gardner - Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974). Less clear, how-
ever, is whether the right to have federal claims determined judicially rather than
in an arbitration proceeding qualifies for this added protection. Compare Patter-
son v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc. 113 F.3d 832, 834 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying ordinary
contract principles in determining whether employee agreed to submit Title VII
claims to arbitration), with Renteria v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 113 F.3d
1104, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating "a Title VII plaintiff may only be forced to
forgo her statutory remedies and arbitrate her claims if she has knowingly agreed
to submit such disputes to arbitration.") Although the Supreme Court has not
specifically reached this issue, it has, in dicta, stated that in agreeing to arbitrate a
federal claim, a party "does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the stat-
ute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, fo-
rum." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985) On the other hand, "by being forced into binding arbitration [employees]
would be surrendering their right to trial byjury-a right that civil rights plaintiffs
(or their lawyers) fought hard for and finally obtained in the 1991 amendments to
Title VII." Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 362 (7th Cir. 1997).
7. Claims of "contracts of adhesion" typically "are judged by whether the
party seeking to enforce the contract has used high pressure tactics or deceptive
language in the contract and whether there is inequality of bargaining power be-
tween the parties." Sablosky v. Edward S. Gordon Co., 535 N.E.2d 643, 647 (N.Y.
1989).
Agreements to arbitrate have
been held to be enforceable if [they have] been openly and fairly en-
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8damental fairness of particular processes. Congress has consid-
ered whether it is against public policy for parties to contract away
the right to have certain disputes determined by a court.9 Further,
commentators have ruminated about the standards arbitrators ap-
ply in making decisions. 0 Courts have also ruled upon issues of
federalism while harmonizing decisions of federal arbitrators with
tered into. In determining whether plaintiff in this case entered into
such agreement, the principles governing enforcement of contracts of
adhesion must be considered. Adhesion contracts refer to a standard-
ized contract form offered to consumers of goods and services essentially
on a 'take it or leave it' basis, without affording the consumer a realistic
opportunity to bargain, and under such conditions that the consumer
cannot obtain the desired product or services except by acquiescing to
the form of the contract
Miner v. Walden, 422 N.Y.S. 335, 337 (1979).
8. It is true that federal courts have never limited their scope of review [of
an arbitration award] to a strict reading of [9 U.S.C. § 10]." Bowles Financial
Group, Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1012 (101 Cir. 1994) (quoting
Jenkins v. Prudential Bache Securities Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 633 (10 1 Cir. 1988)).
Due process in arbitration means satisfying "minimal requirements of fairness."
Ficek v. Southern Pacific Co., 338 F.2d 655, 657 (9 h Cir. 1964).
9. In 1932, Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101-15
(1932). The Norris-LaGuardia Act foreclosed the individual from "contracting
away rights" that are important. Id. § 102.
10. Many people feel that if the arbitration process arises from a consensual
contractual agreement that is entered into by two or more parties who have ex-
plicitly expressed their willingness to be bound by the arbitrator's decision, then
the process the arbitrator undertakes to arrive at his or her decision should not
matter. David A. Lipton, Should Arbitrators Follow the Law, Vol. V., No. 6 SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Mar. 1993, at 2. Realistically, arbitrator's decisions likely include
the utilization of the arbitrator's commercial wisdom and likely do not include the
application of "law." See id.
The practice of commercial arbitration in the United States is indeed
that the arbitrator has the freedom of determining the disputed questions accord-
ing to his sense of the justice of the case. Unless parties expressly or impliedly
wish the arbitrator to determine the question by application of a specific law, the
arbitrator appears free to resolve the dispute on the basis of his just and fair ap-
preciation. GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 25:01, at
391 (rev'd ed. 1990).
In 1961, Professor Soia Mentschikoff conducted a study that revealed, at
that time, ninety percent of the arbitrators polled "believed that they were free to
ignore these rules [of substantive law] whenever they thought that more just deci-
sions would be reached by so doing." Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61
COLUM. L. REv. 846, 861 (1961). "It is well established that arbitrators are not
strictly bound by traditional procedural and evidentiary rules governing judicial
actions." John F.X. Peloso, A Discussion of Whether Arbitrators Have a Duty to Apply
The Law, 949 P.L.I. COP. July-Aug. 1996, at 61, 64. "The New York Stock Ex-
change, American Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities
Dealers each has a specific rule to this effect." Id.
[Vol. 24
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state proceedings." The journey of the law in this area is disjointed
and confusing. Rather than resembling a coherent evolution, the
law of arbitration in this area embodies the definition of morphal-
laxis.
Notwithstanding this quest, recent developments in the arbi-
tration of disputes between individual employees and their em-
ployers, and between the providers of consumer goods and services
and their customers, seem to suggest that the courts are coming to
the end of their analytical ropes in the search for a 'Grand Unified
Theory. ' I These decisions have put into sharp relief the need for a
body of arbitration law distinguished by and specific to the subject
matter of the dispute. Unless a logical and coherent approach is
adopted, even more mutated standards of arbitration agreement
enforcement and judicial review of awards will evolve. This effect
will multiply both the complexity and incoherence of the current
standards. The result will essentially transform arbitration in many
contexts from a final and binding process into a breed of private
litigation with quasi-appellate features.
This article reviews the conflicting and competing considera-
tions with which the courts have struggled. It suggests an ap-
proach to arbitration which strikes a balance between competing
and conflicting considerations without eviscerating arbitration of
its historical benefits. While this section discusses the scope of the
article and provides an outline of attempts to unravel and under-
stand the morphallaxis of arbitration, Section II discusses the cur-
rent state of arbitration, which views the process from the historical
perspective, and then discusses the modern genre of arbitration
and how statutory and case law affect the arbitration process. Sec-
tion III addresses the evolution of judicial tests for arbitration
agreements and their enforceability, and award review. Section IV
touches upon the consumer and non-collective bargaining agree-
ments of employment disputes. There are several intersections and
collisions in this area. As a result, Section V attempts to illuminate
some of the confusion and the meandering effect of the current
11. "We do not believe that a contracting party or a state court may act in any
way to undercut [notions of federalism and comity], where as here a federal court
order compelling arbitration has been issued." Specialty Bakeries, Inc., v. Robhal,
Inc., 961 F. Supp. 822 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
12. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the
Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 637-44
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arbitration path. Finally, Section V provides a conclusion to the
meandering chaos and suggests a possible solution to understand
and categorize the current "morphallaxis" of arbitration.
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE SPECIES: GENESIS OF THE CURRENT STATE
OF THE LAW
A. The Historical Order
1. Ancient Concepts of Limitation
Arbitration has been called "the oldest known method of set-
tlement of disputes...., 3 Even in the earliest of tribal times, arbi-
tration was utilized by decision makers who needed little in the
form of pleadings or discovery. 14 These decision makers made
their decisions based on little to no information of the specific facts
of the case. 5 Accordingly, these decisions were virtually impossible
16
to reverse.
Tribal arbitration awards were based on the principles of fair-
ness, which the Romans called "aequitas." 7 Fairness was critical,
because an obviously unfair and biased decision within the small
community could quickly lead to violence and the possible over-
throw of the decision maker.18
But throughout the ancient history of arbitration, circum-
stances have existed in which an award might be set aside. The
medieval French jurist, Philippe de Beaumanoir records the follow-
ing example:
[§] 1296. A bourgeois committed an offense against an-
13. McAmis v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 273 S.W.2d 789, 794 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1954) (holding "where grievance, submitted for arbitration under bargain-
ing agreement, charged that employee had been unjustly discharged for reasons
not justified by bargaining agreement, award of arbitrators based on evidence re-
lating to those matters within their jurisdiction was binding").
14. See James E. Beckley, Equity and Arbitration, 949 P.L.I. CORP. July-Aug.
1996, at 31, 35.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. The Romans derived the meaning of the "aequitas" term from the
Greek term "EpsilonPilota EpsilonKappaAlphalotaAlpha," which meant reason-
ableness and moderation in the exercise of one's rights and the disposition to
avoid insisting on them too strenuously." Id. (quoting 1 THE COMPAcT EDITION OF
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other by attacking him in such a way that he killed his
horse under him, and beat him, without killing or injur-
ing him, because of a dispute that had arisen among their
relatives [amis]. And after doing this, he repented and
tried to arrange a peace ... and the peace was made on
condition that the offender would be penalized according
to the report and the order of three of the relatives of the
person assaulted, and they were named. And the arbitra-
tors accepted by the assaulter did not take any notice of
the form of the offense, and did not make the report in
conformity with law or pity, but were so outrageous as to
make their report and issue an order that the assaulter
would have to go to Notre Dame of Boulogne, bare-
footed, and would set out the day after the report was
made; and when he came home, he could stay only eight
days, and on the ninth must set out for Santiago de Com-
postella, and when he came home he would leave on the
ninth day to go on foot to St. Gilles in Provence; and
when he came home, on the fifteenth day he would leave
for overseas, and must stay away three years, and bring
back valid writings to show he had stayed there for three
years. And along with this he was to give the person he
assaulted three hundred pounds, and swear on the saints
that if the assaulted man ever needed his help, he would
help him if requested to do so as readily as he would his
own first cousin. And when the person against whom this
order was issued heard this, he said he would never ob-
serve such a report and order, because it was exaggerated
for such a small offense. And the person on whose behalf
the order was pronounced sued the sureties named by the
assaulter to guarantee his observance of the report of the
three arbitrators. And the person naming the sureties, in
order to release them, said that he was not bound by such
an outrageous order, for if he agreed to their arbitration
of his order, it was in good faith, in the belief they would
give an order in good faith and had proceeded like per-
sons full of cruelty and bearing a grudge [haineus], which
two things should be absent from arbitrators and those is-
suing orders. And the other party answered saying that he
must observe their report, because he had obligated him-
self to do so and given sureties. And they requested a
judgment on whether such an order had to be observed.
[§11297. It was judged that the order would not be en-
forced, and that what the arbitrators had said would be
19981
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invalid because they had gone outrageously beyond mod-
eration. And the dispute was reduced by an estimate to
an honest judgment, that is to say that the person commit-
ting the assault paid a fine to the victim and paid his dam-
ages for killing his horse; and he paid a fine to the lord of
sixty pounds, and a guaranteed peace was made between
the parties. And by this judgment you can see that too-
outrageous orders are not to be observed, nor are orders
from arbitrators when they depart from what is contained
in the protocol, such as if they give a report on what they
were not charged with, or on more than they were
charged with.19
2. Post-Colonial America
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, arbitration was
well-established in American common law.2° Arbitration awards
were enforceable at law,2' but the courts did not specifically enforce
voluntary agreements to arbitrate future disputes until the twenti-
eth century.2 2 The non-breaching party's remedy was limited to
damages.
During the late 1800s there was an increased interest in ex-
panding arbitration. A demand for commercial arbitration began
to emerge due to a "court crisis" caused by cumbersome judicial
procedures, court congestion, and the increasing cost of litiga-
tion. Advocates for commercial arbitration saw the process as a
19. THE COUTOUMES DE BEAUvIsIs OF PHILIPPE DE BEAUMANOIR 467-68 (F.R.P.
Akehurst tran., Univ. of Penn. Press 1992).
20. See Mette H. Kurth, An Unstoppable Mandate And An Immovable Policy: The
Arbitration Act And The Bankruptcy Code Collide, 43 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1003 (1996).
21. See IAN R. MACNEIL, et al., FEDERALARBrrRATION LAW § 4.2.2. (1992).
22. See Stempel, supra note 2, at 273-74.
23. See MACNEIL, supra note 21, § 4.2.2. See also Red Cross Line v. Atlantic
Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120-23 (1924). The difficulty was that damages were often
considered an illusory remedy for breach of an arbitration agreement. See Kurth,
supra note 20, at 1004. See also Munson v. Straits of Dover S.S. Co., 102 F. 926, 928
(2d Cir. 1900). Parties had agreed to arbitrate a dispute which instead was liti-
gated when the "claimant" breached the agreement to arbitrate. The party who
would have been the "respondent" in the arbitration incurred attorneys fees and
costs defending the lawsuit, and sought to recover same as damages for the
breach. The court awarded only nominal damages, commenting that the judicial
process is "theoretically, at least, the safest and best devised by the wisdom and
experience of mankind." See id.
24. See Kurth, supra note 20, at 1004.
25. CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY AND INSTI-
TUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT 17-18 (1985).
[Vol. 24
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practical solution to the cost and delay of litigation.26
B. The Modern Genera: Species of Arbitral Constraints and their Varieties
1. Legislative
The enactment of a 1920 New York statute initiated the trend
toward the legal enforceability of agreements to arbitrate and the
codification of limited grounds for judicial review of arbitration
21awards. In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act
28(FAA), modeled after the New York statute. Section 2 of the Act
provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a con-
tract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to set-
tle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the
whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, ir-
revocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract.
29
The opportunities for vacating an award are limited. 30  This
trend became irreversible in 1955 when the National Conference
of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted and in 1956
26. See id. at 36 n.2.
27. 192 N.Y. Laws 275 (1920).
28. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994).
29. 9 U.S.C. §2 (1994).
30. With respect to vacating an award, Section 10 limits such actions as fol-
lows:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration-
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators or
either of them....
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to post-
pone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other mis-
behavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly exe-
cuted them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject mat-
ter submitted was not made.
19981
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amended the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) . Indeed, the legacy
of the old New York statute is apparent in Section 1 of the UAA
which reads:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to
arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit
to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between
the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract. This act also applies to arbitration
agreements between employers and employees or be-
tween their respective representatives [unless otherwise
provided in the agreement].32
Section 12 of the UAA authorizes vacatur of arbitration awards
under narrow circumstances substantially similar to those of the
FAA. 33 The adoption of some form of the UAA by most states has
ended centuries ofjudicial hostility towards arbitration. 4
2. Case Law: Two Similar, Yet Different Strains
a. Commercial Arbitration
The case law regarding the enforceability of agreements to ar-
31. UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1997).
32. Id. § 1.
33. Id. § 12.
(a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue
means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neu-
tral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudic-
ing the rights of any party;
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient
cause being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence material to
the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to
the provisions of section 5, as to prejudice substantially the right of a
party; or
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not ad-
versely determined in proceedings under Section 2 and the party
did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the ob-
jection; but the fact that the relief was such that it could not or
would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for
vacating or refusing to confirm the award.
Id.
34. But see MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERcAL ARBITRATION § 3.02 (1996)
(noting that although the courts of nearly all states uphold agreements to arbi-
trate existing disputes, a small number of jurisdictions still refuse to enforce
agreements to arbitrate future disputes).
[Vol. 24
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bitrate and the judicial review of arbitration awards has developed
along two distinct paths. The first is "commercial" arbitration; vol-
untary agreements between business people who seek a substitute
for court litigation, the benefits of efficiency, lower transaction
costs, decision-maker expertise, and to some extent, consideration
of industry customs and practices. These benefits are sought either
in addition to, and in lieu of, the law as a paradigm for decision-
making.15 Commercial arbitration was the impetus for and the
originally intended subject of both the FAA and the UAA. The
evolution of judicial restraints on commercial arbitrators is the fo-
cus of Section III.
b. Labor Arbitration
Arbitration law's second distinct path flows out of its key role
in labor-management relations and is referred to in this article as
"labor arbitration." Limited judicial review is a legal characteristic
that both commercial and labor arbitration awards share. How-
ever, in an effort to create a coherent, universally applicable set of
legal principles for arbitration law, judicial analysis generally blurs
the essential qualitative differences between the two. As the quid
pro quo for the no-strike provision of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, arbitration in this field developed, not as a substitute for liti-
gation, but as a substitute for industrial strife. 6 Commercial arbi-
tration agreements merely provide a fail-safe mechanism-like the
courts-for the resolution of potential disputes which may or may
not arise ad hoc out of a discrete transaction. On the other hand,
labor arbitration is an ongoing institution of diplomacy and peace-
keeping, designed and implemented to develop, evolve, and moni-
tor norms of interaction between the company and the union.
It is important to note the fundamentally different reasons la-
bor arbitration is accorded a form of great judicial deference simi-
lar to its commercial cousin. Unlike their counterparts in the
35. See Malcolm v. National Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1993)
(noting "[t]he benefits of efficiency can never be purchased at the cost of fair-
ness."); Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1972) (stating that
many uncertainties are eliminated when parties can agree on an acceptable fo-
rum).
36. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957). In Lincoln
Mills, the Supreme Court found that the congressional intent was to promote the
collective bargaining process while trying to avoid the more radical remedy of
strikes. See id at 453. The Court also held that the agreement to arbitrate griev-
ance disputes is the "quid pro quo" for a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining
agreement. See id. at 455. Additionally, the Court found federal policy favors ar-
bitration as a method of preserving industrial peace. See id.
1998]
13
Landrum and Trongard: Judicial Morphallaxis: Mandatory Arbitration and Statutory Rights
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1998
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
commercial field, labor arbitrators have always accompanied theirS• 37
awards with detailed written opinions. But these opinions are not
a privatized substitute for a judge's findings of fact and conclusions
of law. Rather, they are an expression of neutral interpretation of
the terms and provisions of a collective bargaining agreement-a
compact more like a treaty between nations than a commercial
contract's establishment of transactional rights and remedies. The
company and the union have selected the arbitrator as their joint
"alter ego 38 to provide a neutral interpretation of their own nego-
tiated rules of engagement.39 The arbitrator is expected to take into
account how his or her interpretations and rulings will affect the
ongoing labor-management relationship by helping to develop the
"common law of the shop, not of the land."4 A labor arbitration
award will withstand judicial scrutiny if it merely draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement. 1
37. See Note, Compulsory Arbitration in the Unionized Workplace: Reconciling Gil-
mer, Gardner-Denver and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 37 B.C. L. REv. 479, 504
& n.222 (1996) (citing an "[i]nterview with Joan G. Dolan, Arbitrator and Profes-
sor of Arbitration, at Boston College Law School, Newton, Mass. (Apr. 18, 1995)")
(stating that "because labor arbitrators issue written opinions detailing the reason-
ing behind their awards, labor arbitration awards actually would have more value
in the development of the law than would commercial arbitration awards").
38. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37-38
(1987) (stating "[b ] ecause the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by
an arbitrator chosen by them rather than by a judge, it is the arbitrator's view of
the facts and the meaning of the contract that they have agreed to accept"). But
see ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1460 (10th Cir. 1995)
(holding an arbitrator may not use the alter ego principle to compel nonparties
to arbitrate because only the court may compel a party to arbitrate).
39. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 484 U.S. at 38.
40. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974) (quoting
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-83
(1960)).
41. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597 (1960). In this case, a group of employees were fired for walking off the job
in protest of the discharge of another employee. See id. at 595. The collective
bargaining agreement between the union and the employer stated that any disa-
greements "as to the meaning and application" of the contract should be deter-
mined by final, binding arbitration. Id. at 594. The arbitrator reinstated the
workers after a ten day suspension. See id. at 595. The employer, however, failed
to comply with the order. See id. The Supreme Court, reversing the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, held that "[t]he refusal of the courts to review the merits of
an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective bar-
gaining agreements." Id. at 596. The union brought a motion before the district
court to enforce the award and the court directed the employer to comply with
the arbitration decision. The court of appeals reversed the district court stating
since the collective bargaining agreement expired before the award was issued,
the reinstatement and the award of back pay could not be enforced. See id. Addi-
[Vol. 24
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Notwithstanding respectable judicial and scholarly efforts to
integrate lessons from labor arbitration into the "Grand Unified
Theory, "the fundamental differences between labor and commer-
cial arbitration discussed above render such efforts at best inapt
and at worst as contributors to the morphallaxis. Accordingly, for
purposes of this article, standards for judicial review of labor arbi-
tration awards vis ci vis statutory rights will be considered in Section
III.
Another inquiry used by the courts in determining the review-
ability of a labor arbitration award is whether the provision of the
collective bargaining agreement that is the focus of the award is
"susceptible of" the interpretation given by the arbitrator.42  The
Supreme Court's reasoning for this view is not that it is simply part
and parcel of forum selection, as with commercial arbitration, but
exists because of the qualitative nature of the labor arbitration
process and its contribution to refining the ongoing relationship
between the company and the union.4' Labor arbitration is only an
incidental process for resolving individual grievances: it is primarily
an institution for the practice of diplomacy between constituencies
whose continuing relationships are an important part of national
tionally, the parties have agreed to the arbitrator's "informed judgment" regard-
ing the "knowledge of the custom and practices of a particular factory, or of a par-
ticular industry." Id. at 597. Specifically, the court stated that "an arbitrator is
confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agree-
ment; he does not sit to dispense his own hand of industrial justice. He may of
course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so
long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the
arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice
but to refuse enforcement of the award." Id.
42. AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650
(1986) (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co. 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)); see also the cases commonly referred to as the
Steelworkers Trilogy: United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. 363 U.S.
574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960). The Steelworkers Trilogy emphasized the importance of arbitration
to resolve labor-management disputes); Excel Corp. v. United Food and Com.
Workers Int'l Union, Local 431, 102 F.3d 1464, 1465-68 (8th Cir. 1996) (vacating
a labor arbitration award as violative of "clear and unambiguous" contract lan-
guage permitting the termination of employees unable to return to work after
one year of medical leave, notwithstanding union's argument that the provision
should be read as excluding those absences that were due to work-related inju-
ries).
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industrial policy."
Accordingly, efforts to analogize to and borrow from both
bodies of law to formulate approaches to the regulation of manda-
tory arbitration of employment or consumer disputes have resulted
in a metamorphic outcome that continues to mutate with each sub-
sequent judicial effort.45
III. ALTERATION BY MUTATION: THE EVOLUTION OFJUDICIAL
TESTS FOR ARBITRATION AGREEMENT ENFORCEABILITY AND AWARD
REVIEW
A. "Statutory Rights"Analysis
When statutory claims are involved there is a public interest in
the manner in which the statutory law is interpreted and applied.46
That interest is reflected in the evolution of the Supreme Court's
acceptance of agreements to arbitrate statutory-based claims.
1. Trade Regulation Disputes: Specimens for Early Experimentation
In securities law, both Section 14 of the 1933 Securities Act47
and Section 29 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act" prohibit con-
tractual agreements which serve to waive substantive rights pro-
vided to investors under these statutes. 49 A reasonable interpreta-
tion of these provisions might well dictate that arbitrators need to
comply with the law when rendering awards pursuant to contrac-
tual agreements to arbitrate.5 °
44. See id.
45. Interestingly, notwithstanding the principles just discussed, labor arbitra-
tion recently has once again become a focal point for dealing with the current
.collisions and intersections" of analytical and decisional paradigms. See discus-
sion infra notes 280-337 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND Ex-
PERIMENT IN EMPLOYMENT (1997). Professor Richard Bales argues courts will con-
tinue the current trend of enforcing arbitration agreements that are fundamen-
tally fair to employees, but refuse to enforce agreements that are unfair to the
employees.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 77aaaa (1994) (Contrary stipulations void), "Any condition,
stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provi-
sion of this subchapter or with any rule, regulation, or order thereunder shall be
void."
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (a) (1994) (Waiver provisions).
49. David A. Lipton, Should Arbitrators Follow the Law?, 5 SEC. ARB. COM-
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In Wilko v. Swan,5' the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered the question of whether an investor could litigate against a
brokerage firm a misrepresentation claim arising out of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 and Rule 10b-6 of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, notwithstanding an arbitration provision in the inves-
tor-broker agreement. 52 Concerned that arbitrators must make de-
terminations "without judicial instruction on the law," that an
award "may be made without explanation of their reasons, and
without a complete record of their Proceedings," the Wilko court
refused to enforce the agreement. The Court concluded that
"the protective provisions of the Securities Act require the exercise
of judicial discretion to fairly assure their effectiveness," and held
that the statute should be read as preventing a "waiver of judicial
trial and review.
54
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.5 repre-
sented the first significant boost in the Court's elevation of the FAA
to a position of unwarranted stature.56 The broad issue presented
was an updated version of the subject matter dealt with by the court
some thirty-two years earlier in Wilko: Whether the FAA required
the enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate a dispute involving a
federal "statutory right.
" 9
Mitsubishi upheld an agreement to arbitrate antitrust claims
arising under the Sherman Act and implicitly overruled Wilko.
58
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun quoted approvingly
from the Supreme Court's opinion in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospi-
tal v. Mercury Construction Corp.: 
5
[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion .... The [FAA] establishes that, as a matter of fed-
eral law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable is-
51. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
51. See id. at 428.
53. Id. at 436.
54. Id. at 437.
55. 473 U.S. 614, 615 (1985).
56. See Sternlight, supra note 12, at 661-62 (stating the court may "reject pro-
posed statutory exemptions to arbitration").
57. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 616.
58. See id. at 640. A few years later, in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), the Supreme Court took the final step to over-
rule Wilko. The majority rejected Wilko because of its judicial hostility to arbitra-
tion.
59. 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
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sues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether
the problem at hand is the construction of the contract
language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like
defense to arbitrability.
Justice Blackmun further instructed:
Thus, as with any other contract, the parties' intentions
control, but those intentions are generously construed as
to issues of arbitrability. There is no reason to depart
from these guidelines where a party bound by an arbitra-
tion agreement raises claim founded on statutory rights.i
However, there are four significant aspects of the Court's deci-
sion in Mitsubishi which could have prevented the later uncon-
trolled morphing. First, Mitsubishi's agreement dealt with an in-
ternational transaction and involved the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 6' At
various places in the opinion the Court made pointed references to
the "international character" of the litigants' "undertaking," and
noted that "concerns of international comity, respect for the ca-
pacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the
need of the international commercial system for predictability in
the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties'
,,63agreement.... The international character of the transaction
was enough to justify enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate.
The lengthy discourse on the general arbitrability of disputes aris-
ing from "statutory claims" served only to create a rut in the mud of
legal reasoning which the Court has continued to track in other,
totally different "statutory claim" cases. Although in Scherk v. Al-
berto-Culver Co.65 the Supreme Court had an opportunity to directly
confront the issue of arbitrability of a right created by a related
66statute, it resolved the question of arbitrability by resorting to the
60. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 460 U.S. at
24-25 (emphasis added)).
61. Id.
62. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 616. The Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards pertained to claims arising under the
Sherman Act and the claims encompassed within a valid arbitration clause in an
agreement embodying an international commercial transaction. 21 U.S.T. 2517,
T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (1970).
63. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629.
64. See id.
65. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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same distinction articulated in Mitsubishi - the international charac-
ter of the transaction involved.67
The second important element in Mitsubishi was the Court's
own caveat about an overly-broad reading of the opinion:
That is not to say that all controversies implicating statu-
tory rights are suitable for arbitration. There is no reason
to distort the process of contract interpretation, however,
in order to ferret out the inappropriate. Just as it is the
congressional policy manifested in the [FAA] that re-
quires courts liberally to construe the scope of arbitration
agreements covered by that Act, it is the congressional in-
tention expressed in some other statute on which the
courts must rely to identify any category of claims as to
which agreements to arbitrate will be held unenforce-
able.68
This insightful observation has apparently escaped much judi-
cial inquiry in later cases involving the employment and consumer
disputes which have precipitated the need for the approach advo-
cated in Section V this article.
The third important comment is Justice Blackmun's caution-
ary admonition that:
Of course, the courts should remain attuned to well-
supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted
from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that
would provide grounds "for the revocation of any con-
tract." But, absent such compelling considerations, the Act it-
self provides no basis for disfavoring agreements to arbi-
trate statutory claims by skewing the otherwise hospitable
inquiry into arbitrability.
69
The aimless wandering exhibited by the circuit courts of ap-
peal and the Supreme Court in subsequent employment and con-
sumer cases could have been avoided by proper application of this
observation.7°
The fourth and final significant comment arose out of the Mit-
subishi Court's endorsement of the First Circuit's two-step analysis.
Following the Mitsubishi Court's approach, statutory issues were al-
67. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 524.
68. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 434-35
(1953)) (emphasis added); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.11; Dean
Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 224-25 (1985) (White,J., concurring)).
69. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627 (emphasis added).
70. See Section IV, infra.
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ways within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement. It then
went on to consider whether "legal constraints external to the parties'• . ,,71
agreement foreclosed the arbitration of those claims. There is no
good reason why this second part of the inquiry inexplicably went
into remission in dealing with numerous later fact situations where
such "constraints" were arguably present. Although the Mitsubishi
Court ultimately relied on "concerns of international comity"7 2 as
the essential reason the disputed arbitration must go forward, it
clearly recognized the appropriateness of a different conclusion in
other circumstances. 3
2. Later Cases /Early Mutations
The Supreme Court's next significant "statutory claims" muta-
tion also occurred in the trade regulation/securities industry con-
text. However, whereas the dispute in Mitsubishi arose out of an in-
ternational corporate transaction, the court would now revisit
virtually the same issue presented in Wilko-disputes between bro-
ker/dealers and their investing customers.74 In Shearson /American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon,75 the statutory rights involved flowed from:
(1) The Securities Act of 1933, and (2) Rule 1Ob-5. 76 Both rights
impose liability for making misleading or false statements in con-
nection with selling securities. The McMahon decision upheld
agreements mandating the arbitration of such claims by customers
against their brokers. Aside from its heavy reliance on Mitsubishi's
implicit overruling of Wilko,77 the McMahon Court expressly noted
that the SEC had oversight authority to ensure that the arbitration
procedures of the various exchanges (which the SEC had recently
approved) adequately protected statutory rights.78 Finally, the
71. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 629 (holding that respect for the capacities of foreign and transac-
tional tribunals and sensitivity to the need for predictability in international dis-
pute resolution, where the other reasons for the court's decision).
73. Id. (noting that a different result would be forthcoming in a domestic
context).
74. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
75. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
76. Id. at 222-23.
77. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 633. Most notably the observation that "the
mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko opinion in 1953 is diffi-
cult to square with the assessment of arbitration that has prevailed since that
time." See also McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233 (noting that intervening changes in the
regulatory structure of the securities laws have increased the difficulties).
78. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233-34.
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Court articulated the now-familiar refrain that by "agreeing to arbi-
trate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an ar-
bitral, rather than a judicial, forum."79 Two years later, the Court
underscored this view in finally-expressly-overruling Wilko in
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.s°
3. Outbreak: Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes
The next mutation is the classic, still purportedly having to do
with statutes regulating the securities transactions, but touching
only obliquely, at best, on either the workings of the business or
the regulated nature of the industry. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp.s1 generated an entirely new strain of cases, upholding an
industry scheme requiring arbitration of disputes between bro-
81
ker/dealers and their own employees.
Robert Gilmer was terminated from his position as a Manager
of Financial Services for Interstate."3 He sued his former employer
in federal court, alleging a violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) .84 Interstate responded with a motion to
compel arbitration, pursuant to Gilmer's signed application to reg-
ister as a securities representative with several stock exchanges
(called a "U-4" form S), including the New York Stock Exchange.8
6
The U-4 provided that Gilmer agreed to arbitrate any dispute be-
tween him and his employer which was "required to be arbitrated
under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws" of the organizations with
which I register.", 7 NYSE Rule 347, in turn, provided for arbitra-• . 88
tion of any controversy related to his employment. The District
Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied the mo-
tion to compel arbitration, concluding that "Congress intended to
79. Id. at 229-30 (emphasis added) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
80. 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989) (holding a customer with claims under the Se-
curities Act of 1933 could be compelled to arbitrate them pursuant to a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement).
81. 500 U.S. 20, 20 (1991).
82. See id. at 23.
83. See id.
84. See id. The specific statute employed is found at 29 U.S.C. § 621.
85. The arbitration clause contained in the Form U-4 defines those disputes
that plaintiff is required to arbitrate and with whom. It does not determine where
the arbitration must take place.
86. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991).
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,,89
protect ADEA claimants from the waiver of a judicial forum. In a
seven to two decision, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that
Gilmer failed to meet the burden of "showing that Congress, in en-
acting the ADEA, intended to preclude arbitration of claims under
the Act."90
Gilmer had advanced several arguments in support of his posi-
tion: (1) that the arbitration panels provided under the "captive"
industry arbitration program would be biased;9' (2) that the
"discovery allowed in arbitration is more limited than in the federal
courts" (thus making it more difficult to prove discrimination);
92
(3) that the arbitration panels' usual practice of not issuing written
opinions would result "in a lack of public knowledge of employers'
discriminatory policies, an inability to obtain effective appellate re-
view, and a stifling of the development of the law;" 93 (4) "that arbi-
tration procedures cannot adequately further the purposes of the
ADEA because they do not provide for broad equitable relief and
class actions;" 94 and (5) that often there will be unequal bargaining
power between employer and employees. 95
Although the Court addressed each of these arguments, it ba-
sically gave them short shrift, concluding in effect, "maybe so,
somewhere, sometime, but not here and now." However, there is
nothing in the statute itself that would have precluded opposite
conclusions had the Court been inclined to recall its own recogni-
tion in Mitsubishi'6 of potential circumstances where such determi-
nations could be appropriate. Further, the Gilmer Court heavily re-
lied on its McMahon9 7 and Rodriguez de Quijas8 "precedents" in
which the Court buttressed its approval of arbitration by taking
comfort in the SEC's "oversight role." But it could not have es-
caped the Justices that the primary focus of that agency's oversight
mission was never intended to include employee relations. On the
89. Id. at 24. The district court based its decision on the holding found in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
90. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
91. Id. at 30.
92. Id. at 31.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 32.
95. See id. at 33.
96. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985).
97. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
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contrary, the Court summarily dismissed any suggestion of a similar
"oversight role" for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC), with whom Gilmer had filed a charge of discrimina-
tion.
The Court noted that, "Gilmer's argument ignores the ADEA's
flexible approach to resolution of claims. The EEOC, for example,
is directed to pursue informal methods of conciliation, conference,
and persuasion, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), which suggests that out-of-court
dispute resolution, such as arbitration, is consistent with the statutory
scheme established by Congress."99
The Court went on to compare arbitration agreements to the
provision for concurrent federal and state court jurisdiction over
ADEA claims.100 Justice White observed for the majority that both
arbitration agreements and concurrent jurisdiction "serve to ad-
vance the objective of allowing [claimants] a broader right to select
the forum for resolving disputes, whether it be judicial or other-
wise."' 0 '
This reasoning is deficient. First, it should be clear that the
"informal methods of conciliation and persuasion" which the
EEOC was "directed to pursue" are processes which afford the par-
ties an opportunity for voluntary, negotiation-based settlement. For
the Supreme Court to conclude from this directive's support of
bargaining-based ADR processes that Congress has imposed on the
agency a sweeping policy virtually mandating all forms of out-of-
court dispute resolution, including mandatory, binding arbitration, is
102at best flawed reasoning and at worst self-serving judicial policy.
Second, in the Court's comparisons between the objectives of
concurrent jurisdiction and arbitration agreements, the phraseol-
ogy of "allowing" claimants to "select" the forum is inapt. To com-
pare the choice of whether to have a claim heard in federal or state
court with the "choice" Gilmer had with respect to signing his U-4
form is an exercise in erroneous logic and discounts the realities of
employer-employee relationships.
Similarly, although agreeing with Gilmer that the ADEA is de-
signed not only to address individual grievances, but also to further
important social policies, the Court did "not perceive any inherent
99. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added).
100. See id. (citing Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 483).
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. See Sternlight, supra note 12. Driven, perhaps by the judicial obsession
with court delays and backlogs.
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inconsistency between those policies ... and enforcing agreements
to arbitrate age discrimination claims. In citing several suppor-
tive decisions' lines of reasoning while distinguishing those which
were arguably contrary, and in dismissing Gilmer's concerns about
the fundamental fairness of the process, the Court simplistically
relied on the FAA itself as an expression of a "liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements. ", °4  The Court concluded that
"[i]t is by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an
arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA."105
4. The Virus Spreads: The Progeny of Gilmer
Since Gilmer, numerous circuit courts of appeal have consid-
ered the issue of mandatory arbitration of statutory employment
rights. 10 6 The Southern District of New York, whether emboldened
or mandated by Gilmer and its progeny, has recently produced still
another mutation in the evolution of the substantive right/forum
choice analysis. The DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc.'°7 court upheld
an arbitration agreement between a securities industry employee
and employer that expressly waived rights to attorney's fees, injunc-
tive relief and punitive damages. 18 In Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., '9 the Fifth Circuit required plaintiffs compliance with an
agreement to arbitrate discrimination claims.'
Not long after Alford, the Tenth Circuit decided Metz v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc."' Applying the ADEA-context
reasoning of Gilmer to Metz's Title VII claim, the court held that
the plaintiffs pregnancy-related sex discrimination Title VII claim
was subject to the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) industry mandatory arbitration program as invoked by her
103. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27.
104. Id. at 35 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625).
105. Id. at 26.
106. See Sternlight, supra note 12, at 671 n.202; See also Bender v. A.G. Edwards
& Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (110 ' Cir. 1992); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9"' Cir. 1992); Wilis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d.
305 (6d' Cir. 1991); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5"' Cir.
1991).
107. No. 95 CIV.1613, 1996 WL 44226, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1996), rev'd,
1997 WL 697928 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1997) (reversing the denial of attorney fees).
108. See id. (stating the motion to compel arbitration presents a new issue of
law and the court decided to use its discretion by not imposing attorney's fees).
109. 939 F.2d 229 (5" Cir. 1991).
110. See id. at 229-30.
111. 39 F.3d 1482 (10" Cir. 1994).
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signed U-4 form."2 Like Gilmer, Metz argued that her registration
form was a contract of adhesion and should therefore be unen-
forceable."' Contract of adhesion arguments are, for the most
part, without merit.1 4 Modem commercial realities require the
widespread use in many industries and contexts of form contracts
that are not subject to negotiation.1 1 5 The court found that inas-
much as a party had signed the agreement voluntarily, no further
inquiry was required. "
6
The Ninth Circuit, however, has recently put the subject line
of cases into regional remission. 117 Clearly bothered by what it per-
ceived as an inequitable situation, but constrained by Gilmer,"5 the
court created another subspecies of analysis and decision-making
in Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Lai."9 In Lai, plaintiffs Lai
and Viernes, sales representatives for Prudential, sued their em-
ployer and immediate supervisor in state court asserting various
claims of sexual harassment. Prudential then brought an action
in federal court to compel arbitration under the NASD program,
pursuant to the plaintiffs' U-4 forms.
1 2 '
After considering all the usual Gilner-type arguments, the
court focused its examination on the circumstances under which
the agreement to arbitrate was entered into, and, in particular,
112. See id. at 1488.
113. See id.
114. Common law has recognized that standardized form contracts are a sig-
nificant portion of all commercial agreements, therefore, the courts look more
toward the reasonableness of the contract. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhe-
sion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1173, 1179-80 (1983); W. David
Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 12-13
(1974); KARL LLEWELLvN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370-71 (1960).
115. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), in
which ajudicial forum selection provision in a "contract of adhesion" was upheld.
However, the significance of whether an agreement is a contract of adhesion
(other than the egregious cases of threats, coercion and undue influence), is not
whether the agreement will be upheld, but rather, which rules of interpretation
will apply to the agreement. See id. at 592- 95.
116. See id. See also Penelope Hopper, Mandatory Arbitration And Title VII: Can
Employees Ever See Their Rights Vindicated Through Statutory Causes of Action, 2 J. DiSP.
RESOL. 315, 323-25 (1995) (noting the court's distinction between "voluntary" and
"involuntary" agreements).
117. See Prudential Ins. Co. ofAmericav. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
118. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 20 (1991).
119. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994). For a review and analysis of this decision,
see Catherine Chatman, Mandatory Arbitration of Title VII Claims: A New Approach
Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Lai, 1 J. DisP. REsOL. 255 (1996).
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whether it was a "knowing agreement. For support in this ap-
proach, the court invoked, among other considerations, the legisla-
tive history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.123 The court reviewed a
House of Representatives report that dealt in part with congres-
sional comments regarding Section 118 of the new Act, which, un-
like the EEOC directive considered in Gilmer, specifically encour-
ages the use of arbitration to resolve claims arising under it. 24 The
court cited Senator Dole's statement that arbitration would be ap-
propriate only "where the parties knowingly and voluntarily elect to
use these methods."
25
Having adopted "knowing waiver" as the applicable standard,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Lai plaintiffs were not re-
quired to submit their Title VII claims to NASD arbitration be-
cause: (1) they were not afforded an opportunity to read the
agreement; (2) they were misled as to its contents; and (3) the U-4
form failed to specify exactly what disputes were subject to arbitra-
tion.126
But the new subspecies of "knowing waiver" thrives for now
only in its natural habitat of the Northern District of California.
The test was rejected in the hostile environment of the Southern
District of New York in Hall v. Metlife Resources.12 In Hall, echoing
the McMahon/Gilmer refrain, the court reasoned that U4-mandated
arbitration agreements constitute merely a forum choice, and not a
waiver of substantive rights guaranteed by Title VII.1
2
1
B. Arbitration and Substantive Law
Related, albeit somewhat obliquely, to the consideration of
appropriate limits on the arbitration of disputes involving
"statutory rights" per se, are two lines of cases regarding the inter-
play between arbitration and substantive law. The first deals with
whether arbitrators should be required to adhere to the law at all
in making their decisions. The second, which assumes the first, ex-
amines the principle of "manifest disregard" of law.
122. See id. at 1304.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 1305 (citing 137 Cong. Rec. S.15472, S.15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30,
1991) (statement of Sen. Dole)). See also Chatman, supra note 119, at 262.
126. See Chatman, supra note 119, at 262 (citing Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305).
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1. Role of the Law in Arbitrators'Decision-Making Processes
When an arbitration award is challenged based on the arbitra-
tor's purported misapplication of statutory law, "there is a tension
between the tradition of limited judicial review of arbitration
awards and the presence of an independent public interest in en-
suring that the law is correctly and consistently being ap-
plied... ."g
The Supreme Court addressed this tension in Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. s'5 In Mitsubishi, the Court distin-
guished pre-arbitration attempts to avoid enforcement of an arbi-
tration agreement from post-arbitration attempts to vacate an
award."' According to Professor Bales, the Mitsubishi Court de-
cided that the FAA requires a presumption that the arbitrator will
decide the dispute in accordance with the applicable law. The
mere possibility that an arbitrator will misapply the law, therefore,
will not serve as a basis for refusing to enforce an arbitration
agreement.'
12
There appears to be an abundance of compelling statutory,
case law, and public policy arguments supporting reasons why arbi-
trators should apply the rule of law.i3 3 How can it be possible that
the rule of law position is not more commonly accepted?Im
Although, the case law requiring arbitrators to apply the rule is
compelling, it is not etched in stone, nor is it a "commandment.'1
5
Additionally, several practical and legal considerations suggest that
the rule of law position is at most, suggestive.1
6
First of all, how could arbitrators be required to apply the law
if non-lawyers may sit as arbitrators? 13 A possible response points
out the American jury system which resolves legal disputes even
though the juries are typically not made up of lawyers. However,
129. Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66
CHI-KENTL. REv. 753, 777 (1990).
130. 473 U.S. 614, 614 (1985).
131. See BALES, supra note 46, at 135.
132. See id. at 135-36 nn.128-29 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636-37).
133. A study indicates that over 90-percent of the arbitrators polled felt they
did not need to apply the law. See Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61
COLUM. L. REv. 846,861 (1961).
134. See Lipton, supra note 49, at 2-3.
135. Id. at 3-4.
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a counter argument is that juries are instructed and supervised by
judges who are lawyers and no such instructions or supervision is
given to non-lawyer arbitrators. 9 In the securities area of arbitra-
tion, for example, most self-regulatory bodies usually include law-
yers on their arbitration panels when legal expertise is required.
140
Second, if arbitrators were required to apply the law, this re-
quirement would be relatively meaningless unless there exists a
method for enforcing its application. 41 The standards for vacating
awards set forth in both the FAA and state variants of the UAA are
not interpreted to mean that an arbitration award may be over-
turned if the arbitrator fails to apply the law. 142 Various state law
standards for vacating arbitration awards are typically similar to the
federal standards. 43 No state law standard includes failure to apply
the law as a proper reason for vacating an arbitration award.'"
In his recent book on compulsory arbitration Professor Rich-
ard A. Bales speculates that we are currently witnessing an experi-
ment to determine whether arbitration should become the pre-
eminent method of resolving workplace disputes in the nonunion'45
sector. Bales asserts that courts likely will continue the current
trend of enforcing arbitration agreements that are fundamentally
fair to employees, while refusing to enforce those agreements that
are unfair. 46
Bales claims that "the argument that an arbitral decision al-
ready rendered is based on a misapplication of the law may justify a
court's vacation of the award."1 47 The Mitsubishi Court stated that
"the national courts of the United States will have the opportu-





144. See id. But see MINN. R. GEN. P. 114. Rule 114 sets forth the state's
mechanism for court-annexed non-binding arbitration. See id. Rule 114 provides
that the arbitrator has the power to "decide the law and the facts of the case and
make an award accordingly." MINN. R. GEN. P. 411.09 (b). Rule 114 also provides
that "[1]f the parties stipulate in advance, the award is binding and is enforceable
in the same manner as a contractual obligation." MINN. R. GEN. P. 411.02 (a) (1).
A more intriguing question is how these provisions square with Minnesota's form
of the UAA, which provides, "but the fact that the relief was such that it could not
or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or
refusing to confirm the award." MINN. STAT. § 572.19, subd. 1(5) (1996).
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nity... to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of
... [statutory] laws ha[ve] been addressed."'4
Bales believes that the Supreme Court stopped far short of in-
dicating that an arbitral award would be reviewable for factual or
legal error in the same way as an adjudication by a trial court:
"While the efficacy of the arbitral process requires that substantive
review at the award-enforcement stage remain minimal, it would
not require intrusive inquiry to ascertain that the tribunal took
cognizance of the [statutory] claims and actually decided them." 149
"This language seems to imply that courts will examine arbitral
awards only to ensure that statutory issues were considered and de-
cided, which is markedly different from 'ensur[ing] that the le-
gitimate interest in the enforcement of statutory laws have been
addressed.'"
50
2. "Manifest Disregard of the Law"
In reviewing arbitration decisions involving statutory claims,
courts typically refuse to reverse an award based on the "mere" fact
that the arbitrator incorrectly interpreted or applied the law.'
5'
Rather, the courts utilize the standard that they will reverse an arbi-
trator's decision only if the arbitrator acted in "manifest disregard
of the law."
152
This judicial strategy for dealing with awards at variance with
established legal principles originated from dicta in the 1953 Su-
preme Court decision in Wilko v. Swan.'" In that case the Court in-
validated the use of pre-dispute arbitration provisions in securities
agreements mainly because of the "old judicial hostility to arbitra-
148. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
638 (1985); see also BALES, supra note 46, at 136.
149. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638; see also BALES, supra note 46, at 136.
150. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638.
151. See BALES, supra note 46, at 136. Bales cites the following cases in support
of this assertion: Gingiss Int'l, Inc., v. Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 333 (7th Cir. 1995);
Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 940 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
915 (1993); Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 683 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 870 (1992); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.,
551 F.2d 136, 143 (7th Cir. 1977); Republic of Korea v. New York Navigation Co.,
Inc., 469 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1972); Regina M. Lyons, Testamentary Trust v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 302, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). See BALES,
supra note 46, 136 n.132.
152. See BALES, supra note 46, at 136; see discussion infra Part III.B.2.
153. 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled on other grounds, Rodrigues de Qui-
jas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
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tion.', 154 The primary reasons the Wilko Court was uncomfortable
with arbitration in securities disputes were that arbitrators lacked
'judicial instruction on the law," awards may be made without ex-
planation or a complete record of the arbitration proceedings, and
the " [p] ower to vacate an award is limited.'
155
Notwithstanding the later reversal of Wilko's primary holdings,
the "manifest disregard" standard continues to be raised and dis-
cussed. 15 For years it has been conventional wisdom that, although
many courts have spoken to the issue, no arbitration award has ever
been vacated on this ground. 57 But on November 24th, 1997, the
Eleventh Circuit made such a finding in Montes v. Shearson Lehman
Brothers, Inc."' The Court reversed and remanded an arbitration
award on the basis of manifest disregard of the law.
In Montes, the plaintiff, a security industry employee, had
signed an agreement to arbitrate all disputes with her employer.
After she stopped working for Shearson she brought a state court
action alleging that under the Fair Labor Standards Act 5' she was
entitled to overtime pay and that she had not been so compensated
during certain periods of her employment with Shearson. The
154. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 480 (citing Kulukundis Shipping Co. v.
Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)).
155. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436. The Wilko Court noted the following in dicta:
While it may be true, as the [Second Circuit] Court of Appeals thought, that a
failure of the arbitrators to decide in accordance with [applicable law] would
"constitute grounds for vacating the award pursuant to Section 10 of the Federal
Arbitration Act" that failure would need to be made clearly to appear.... [T] he
interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are
not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37 (footnotes and citations omitted).
156. See id.
157. See BALES, supra note 46, at 136; but see Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov,
Leonard & Sween, 556 N.W. 2d 557, 562 (Minn. 1996) (finding that arbitrator's
award of emotional distress damages in a legal malpractice case vacated where
parties had agreed that any "legal" decisions made by the arbitrator would be sub-
ject to judicial review and state law does not permit such damages in such an ac-
tion. Although this was a case of "manifest disregard," the better analysis of the
grounds for vacatur is that the arbitrator exceeded his authority). See also BALES,
supra note 46, at 136 n.136 (citing Stephen L. Hayford and Michael J. Evers, The
Interaction between the Employment-At-Will Doctrines and Employer-Employee Agreements to
Arbitrate Statutory Fair Employment Practices Claims: Difficult Choices for At-Will Employ-
ees, 73 N.C. L. REV. 443 (1995); Brad A. Galbraith, Note, Vacatur of Commercial Arbi-
tration Awards in Federal Court: Contemplating the Use and Utility of the "Manifest Disre-
gard of the Law" Standard, 27 IND. L. REv. 241, 252 (1993)); but see Lickteig, 556
N.W.2d at 560.
158. 128 F.3d 1456 (1997).
159. 29 U.S.C. § 201-19 (1994).
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employer removed the case to federal district court, where it con-
tended that as an "administrative" or "executive" employee Montes
was exempt from the Act's overtime pay requirements. That court
referred the case to an arbitration panel, which found in favor of
Shearson. Montes appealed the district court's denial of her peti-
tion to vacate the award.
Montes argued on appeal that enforcement of the arbitration
award would be "violative of public policy.", °' The court observed
that her arguments were "overlapping versions of three non-
statutory reasons for vacating arbitration decisions...: that the deci-
sion (1) is arbitrary or capricious; (2) is in manifest disregard of
the law; and (3) is violative of public policy."' 6' The court recog-
nized each as a distinct ground, but because the thrust of this case
involved the specific direction to disregard the law, the court chose
to focus primarily on the manifest disregard standard.
The record showed that at the arbitration hearing Shearson's
counsel had urged the panel not to follow the FLSA and to reject
Montes' claim for overtime pay, even if it were determined that her
job duties and responsibilities did not qualify her for the exemp-
tion. On appeal, Shearson asserted that its counsel at the arbitra-
tion hearing was merely arguing that Montes did not qualify for
overtime under the statute and therefore, the arbitrators were not
bound by the FLSA.
The court did not accept Shearson's interpretation. Arbitra-
tion counsel had urged the panel to exercise its "ability" to be "not
strictly bound by case law and precedent;" to recognize the
"difference between law and equity;" that "in this case the law is not
right" and to "do what is right.. .fair and proper;" and "not to fol-
low the FLSA if you determine she's not an exempt employee."
6 2
The court concluded that "trial counsel's meaning is clear: not-
withstanding Montes' entitlement to overtime under the FLSA, the
arbitrators should ignore the dictates of the law.,
163
Although the court noted that under Wilko an arbitration
panel's erroneous interpretation of the law is not grounds for vaca-
tur, manifest disregard of it is. The court said it could "clearly dis-
cern from the record... that arbitrators recognized that they were
told to disregard the law (which the record reflects they knew) in a
160. Montes, 128 F.3d at 1459.
161. Id. at n.5.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1462.
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case in which the evidence to support the award was marginal."64
But more importantly, in still another example of judicial
morphallaxis, the Eleventh Circuit found that "there [was] nothing
in the record to refute the suggestion that the law was disregarded." 6-
The court vacated the award and remanded it to the district court
for referral to a new arbitration panel.
In addition courts' general refusal to invoke the "manifest dis-
regard" standard, no jurisdiction has found "mere error of law" as aS •. 166
basis for vacating arbitration decisions. The most likely reason
for this is that, despite adoption of the "manifest disregard" stan-
dard by several circuits, there is still uncertainty about to how to
determine whether, in rendering an award, an arbitrator has vio-
lated it.167 The first serious judicial effort at developing a definition
is contained in the Second Circuit's decision in Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith v, Bobker. After first noting that the standard had
never been defined, 16 the court articulated its view on the issue:
[The arbitrator's] error must have been obvious and ca-
pable of being readily and instantly perceived by the aver-
age person qualified to serve an arbitrator. Moreover, the
term "disregard" implies that the arbitrator appreciates
the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but
decides to ignore or pay no attention to it. 69
Although this is a long way from insisting that arbitrators
comply strictly with the law, the Bobker decision does seem to pro-
hibit those who know the law from openly ignoring it.'70
In effect, the reported decisions reflect two different interpre-
tations of the "manifest disregard of the law" standard. The first is
to require that "arbitrators comply with the law, while recognizing
164. Id.
165. Id. (emphasis added).
166. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953). The dissent in Wilko provides
yet another "relatively forceful" interpretation of the concept of "manifest disre-
gard of the law" standard. Id. at 439-40. The dissent states that arbitrators were
"bound to decide in accordance with the provision" of a specific securities statute
Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. Id. at 440. The dissenting justices would appar-
ently not allow arbitrators much freedom to deviate from a strict reading of the
law. See Lipton, supra note 49, at 5.
167. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37.
168. 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986).
169. Id. In other words, the Second Circuit holds for there to be manifest dis-
regard of the law by arbitrators, the arbitrators must know and understand the le-
gal principles pertaining to an issue then ignore these principles. See Lipton, su-
pra note 49, at 5.
170. See Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933.
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that mere errors of law will not constitute a basis for vacating an
arbitration award." 7' The second does not hold arbitrators to strict
compliance with the law, but requires merely that their decisions
not be "offensive" to it."' As a practical matter, which interpreta-
tion is most often adopted is not very important, since under ei-
ther version of the standard, it is very difficult for courts to deter-
mine when it has been violated. 11 Moreover, arbitration award are
rarely vacated or modified because of any kind of finding akin to
"manifest disregard of the law.' 7 4 The primary reason is that, out-
side the collective bargaining context, arbitrators rarely provide
written explanations of their decisions. 75 Without a written record,
courts can examine only the award itself or perhaps any transcripts
of the hearing to determine whether there has been a "manifest
disregard of the law."
17 6
Frequently courts express their frustration in determining
"manifest disregard of the law" with statements such as:
We note simply that the arbitrators gave no explanation
whatsoever regarding the award. Since nothing on the
face of the record indicates that the arbitrators were aware
of some legal standard which they ignored in fashioning
their award, we [the court] certainly cannot say that the
district court abused its discretion in confirming the
171. Id. at 933-34.
172. Id.
173. See Lipton, supra note 49, at 5.
174. See id. In a survey of over forty neutrally-selected post 1988 securities
cases involving "manifest disregard of the law," there was not a single instance un-
covered of a judicial finding of "manifest disregard of the law." In two of the sur-
veyed cases, both in the Southern District of New York, Tinaway v. Merrill Lynch
and Co., 692 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), and In re Fahnestock & Co., Inc., No. Civ.
1792 (PKL), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11024 at *8 (S.D.N.Y., Aug, 23, 1990), the
court, on rehearing a previously decided case, dismissed plaintiffs claim for puni-
tive damages, but, not because of "manifest disregard of the law." See David A. Lip-
ton, Should Arbitrators Follow the Law? (... and if they should, how can they be so en-
couraged?), CRITICAL ISSUES IN ARBITRATION CONFERENCE, ANA Section of Litigation:
Arbitration Committee, 3 (New York, NY, Nov. 5, 1993). In a third surveyed case,
an arbitration panel's award was overturned because the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that the arbitrator's award was "arbitrary and capricious." See
Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 941 (11th Cir. 1992).
175. See Lipton, supra note 49, at 5.
176. See id. for example, out of twenty-one cases in the above mentioned sur-
vey, in only one case was the court's determination regarding the existence of
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award.177
The analysis becomes even more confusing with cases involv-
ing the National Association of Security Dealers (NASD). Without
a written opinion or at least some type of written findings of fact
and conclusions of law, there are only three ways for the court to
determine whether there has been a "manifest disregard of the
law:"
1) a finding that the award is inconsistent with the nature
of the claim (e.g., punitive damages awarded pursuant to
177. Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 903 F.2d 1410,
1413 (1987). Similarly, in Sargent v. Paine WebberJackson & Curtis, Inc., 882 F.2d
529, 530-32 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the court found that:
[T]he arbitrators did not explain how they reached [the figure for the
award]. The parties agree that the New York Stock Exchange rules re-
quire no explanation; it appears to be standard practice for arbitrators
under those rules to give none.... We reject the idea that a lump-sum
award can be rejected for want of explanation ... in the absence of facts
making it appear probable that the arbitrators committed an error justi-
fying vacation of the award.
In Rotfeld v. Boenning & Scattergood, Inc., No. 91-3659, at *7, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11618 (E.D. Pa. 1991), the court noted its inability to assess the exis-
tence of "manifest disregard of the law" The court stated that:
Unfortunately, the [arbitration] panel did not disclose which set of facts
it chose to believe. In the event that the panel accepted [the plaintiffs]
set of facts as true, there has either been a gross miscalculation of dam-
ages or a manifest disregard of the relevant law.
Id.
And, in yet another case, the "manifest disregard of the law" was chal-
lenged but denied. See Merrill Lynch v. Burke, 741 F. Supp. 191, 193-94 (1991).
The district court stated that:
[T] he arbitrators here made no findings, stated no evidence, and made
no reference to any legal standard.... This court cannot say from the
record before it, or from the lack of a record before it, that the arbitra-
tors exceeded their powers or totally disregarded the applicable law for
an award of punitive damages.
Id.
In the Ninth Circuit, the court twice stated a willingness to vacate an
award for "manifest disregard of the law." See Western Employers Ins. v. Jefferies
& Co., 958 F.2d 258, 261 (9th Cir. 1992) and Local Joint Executive Bd. v. River-
boat Casino, Inc., 817 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1987). InJefferies, an arbitration
award was vacated because the arbitrators did not provide the claimant with
"findings of fact and conclusions of law." 958 F.2d at 262. (stating that the arbitra-
tion contract covering the securities dispute clearly required such findings and
conclusions). Even though the Jefferies court did not find "manifest disregard of
the law," it did conclude that the arbitrators had exceeded their authority in not
providing the contractually agreed upon form of award and thus the award was
susceptible to being vacated under the Federal Arbitration Act. See id. (citing to 9
U.S.C. § 10(d) (1994)).
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federal securities law);178
2) a finding that the record indicates a manifest disregard
of the law (for example, arbitrators saying that the back-
ground of a customer was irrelevant to a suitability claim);
or if
3) the court asks the panel to go back and explain its
award and the court then determines that the reasons of
the panel are in manifest disregard of the law. 79
A written report or opinion, completed by the arbitrator,
would make it much easier for the court to determine if the
"manifest disregard of the law" standard has been violated.18
Even if the law does require arbitrators to apply the law in
rendering their awards, the big problem would be the practical
means of enforcing such a requirement."'I The current scope of
judicial review does not include vacating an award because the ar-
bitrator ignored the law.
In 1923 the New York Superior Court rationalized this view,
observing that most arbitrators "are usually laymen, inexperienced
in the technical rules of law, but usually possessed with a fund of
common sense which enables them to do substantial justice be-
tween the parties. To require an arbitrator to follow the fixed rules
of law in arriving at his award would operate to defeat the object of
the proceedings."
8 3
We opine that the prevalence of "lay" arbitrators has dimin-
ished since 1923. The current minimal standard for arbitrators is
too low.1 4 "When an arbitrator is called upon to interpret a clause
178. One example of this would be pursuant to a 1934 Act, § 10 (b) (1994),
claim.
179. Lipton, supra note 49, at 6.
180. See id. If you want to avoid this problem, the decision in Pacific Gas and
Electric Co. v. The Superior Court of Sutter County, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295, 295 (1993),
may provide some guidance. The case states that the parties to the arbitration
may want to do the following:
1. Clarify in the arbitration clause that not only is the arbitrator con-
strained to follow the law but also that the scope of judicial review in-
cludes questions of law;
2. Clarify in the arbitration clause specifically what remedies the arbitra-
tor is empowered to grant; and
3. Be sure to state everything clearly in the arbitration agreement.
See id. at 302-10.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. Everett v. Brown, 198 N.Y.S. 462, 465 (1923).
184. The parties should be free to chose an arbitrator with whom they are
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contained in a commercial contract, or a term in a collective bar-
gaining agreement, she is interpreting "private" law - law contrac-
tually created by the parties to govern the parties and no one
else. 1 8 5 "Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to permit the
parties to agree in advance that the arbitrator's decision will not be
appealable because the arbitrator misinterpreted the contract or
misconstrued the underlying facts."'86 "It is assumed that the par-
ties knew that they were agreeing to limited judicial review when
they signed the arbitration agreement, and that, since any arbitral
mistake affects only the parties themselves, the parties should be
held to their bargain.' 8 7
C. "Fair Hearing" Test 88
One of the oldest case law requirements for supporting
agreements to arbitrate as well as the enforcement of awards stipu-
lates that the process must afford the parties a "fair hearing." In its
1854 Burchell v. Marsh decision,8 9 the Supreme Court stated that,
"[i]f the [arbitration] award is within the submission, and contains
the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing
of the parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error, either
in law or fact."' 90
In Forsythe International S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of Texas ' the court
stated that "[i]n reviewing the district court's vacatur, we posit the
same question addressed by the district court: whether the arbitra-
tion proceedings were fundamentally unfair.' 92 In Hoteles Condado
comfortable without regard for qualifications. When the parties have not previ-
ously agreed, however, the default nomination should be an arbitrator of high
competence.
185. See BALES, supra note 46, at 135.
186. See id.
187. See id. Under contract law, there is a basic presumption that states-ba-
sically-"a deal's a deal."
188. The "fair hearing" consideration is one in which cases involving both
commercial and labor arbitrations are often cited together. One reason for this
may be the historical practice in labor arbitration of hearing transcripts and ex-
tensive written awards. Nevertheless, some of the leading "collision" cases dis-
cussed infra, point out that a "fair hearing" of a grievance based on the same facts
as would constitute a statutory cause of action (e.g., challenging a discharge for
being without "just cause" because it was a product of illegal race discrimination)
may not pass judicial muster.
189. 58 U.S. 344, 344 (1854).
190. Id. at 349.
191. 915 F.2d 1017, 1017 (5th Cir. 1990).
192. Id. at 1020.
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Beach v. Union De Tronquistas Local 901,195 the First Circuit held that
"[v]acatur is appropriate only when the exclusion of relevant evi-
dence 'so affects the right of a party that it may be said that he was
deprived of a fair hearing. 19 4 In National Post Office Majihandlers v.
United States Postal Service,'9' the court stated that "the standard for
judicial review of arbitration procedures is merely whether a party
to arbitration has been denied a fundamentally fair hearing. In
Bell Aerospace Co. Division of Textron v. Local 516,197 the Court stated
that "an arbitrator need not follow all the niceties observed by the
federal courts. He need only grant the parties a fundamentally fair
hearing."198
Courts appear to agree that the parties deserve the following:
(1) a fundamentally fair hearing; (2) adequate notice of the hear-
ing; (3) an opportunity to be heard; (4) an opportunity to present
relevant and material evidence; (5) an opportunity to make their
argument before the arbitrator; and, (6) an impartial arbitrator9
"[A] hearing is fundamentally fair if it meets the 'minimal re-
quirements of faimess'-adequate notice, a hearing on the evi-
dence, and an impartial decision by the arbitrator."
200
D. Illegality / Public Policy
The standards of the "illegality" and "public policy" overlap
and the two are often discussed together by the courts. In United
193. 763 F.2d 34, 34 (1st Cir. 1985).
194. Id. at 40 (citation omitted).
195. 751 F.2d 834, 834 (6th Cir. 1985).
196. Id. at 841.
197. 500 F.2d 921, 921 (2d Cir. 1974).
198. Id. at 923.
199. See BALES, supra note 46, at 135 n.123, (citing Bowles Fin. Group v.
Sheele, Nicholas & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1013 (10th Cir. 1994)). See also Robbins v.
Day, 954 F.2d 679, 685 (11th Cir.) (stating "the Federal Arbitration Act allows ar-
bitration to proceed with only a summary hearing and with restricted inquiry into
factual issues."), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 870 (1992); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Na-
tional Union Fire Co., 933 F.2d 1481, 1491 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that fair
hearing is based on notice, opportunity to be heard and to present evidence, and
lack of biased decision making); Sunshine Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers of
Am., 823 F.2d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that "[a] hearing is fundamen-
tally fair if it meets the 'minimal requirements of fairness' - adequate notice, a
hearing on the evidence, and an impartial decision by the arbitrator.") (citing
Ficek v. Southern Pacific Co., 338 F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 988 (1965)); Hoteles Condado Beach, 763 F.2d at 38-39 (finding that arbitrator
must give each party an adequate opportunity to present evidence and argu-
ments).
200. Sunshine Mining Co., 823 F.2d at 1295.
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Paperworks International Union v. Misco, Inc.,01 the Supreme Court
suggested that the two standards should be independent.202  "A
court's refusal to enforce an arbitrator's award.., because it is
contrary to public policy is a specific application of the more gen-
eral doctrine, rooted in the common law, that a court may refuse to
enforce contracts that violate law or public policy."2 0 3 The Court
continued by stating that courts will not aid an "immoral or illegal
act."
20 4
The "public policy" standard for arbitration awards was first
indirectly established in Hurd v. Hodge.2°  The Hurd Court held
that the courts' power to enforce private agreements must be sub-
ject to "limitations of the public policy of the United States as
manifested in the Constitution, treaties, federal statutes, and appli-
cable legal precedents."20 6 The Supreme Court directly addressed
the "public policy" exception to arbitration awards in W.R. Grace &
Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union of United Rubber Workers.
207
In Grace the employer violated the collective bargaining agreement
it had with the union.2°' The Supreme Court concluded:
As with any contract.., a court may not enforce a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement that is contrary to public pol-
icy.... [T] he question of public policy is ultimately one
for resolution by the courts. If the contract as interpreted
[by the arbitrator] violates some explicit public policy, we
are obliged to refrain from enforcing it. Such a public
policy, however, must be well defined and dominant, and
is to be ascertained "by reference to the laws and legal
precedents and not from general considerations of sup-.,209
posed public interests."
E. FAA Preemption Analysis
A completely different aspect of the role of the FAA and a
most significant analytical framework emerged from the U.S. Su-
201. 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
202. See id. at 42.
203. Id.
204. See id.
205. 334 U.S. 24, 24 (1948).
206. Id. at 35 (citing Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945).
207. 461 U.S. 757, 757 (1983).
208. See id. at 760.
209. Id. at 766 (quoting Muschany, 324 U.S. at 66 (citations omitted)).
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preme Court's 1984 decision in Southland Corporation v. Keating.
2 10
Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court, which
held that the California Franchise Investment Law's invalidation of
an agreement between franchisers and franchisee to arbitrate dis-
putes arising under the state statute impermissibly conflicted with
the FAA and violated the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution:
In enacting Section 2 of the Federal Act, Congress de-
clared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew
the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the
resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed
211to resolve by arbitration.
212Southland was followed by Perry v. Thomas which under the
preemption theory, invalidated a provision of the California Labor
Code which provided that certain wage collection actions could be
maintained in court, notwithstanding the existence of an agree-
ment to arbitrate such claims.
21 3
214Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson involved a contract
that invalidated an Alabama law making predispute arbitration
215agreements unenforceable. The contract in question was be-
tween an Alabama homeowner and a termite exterminating com-
pany based in another state.
216
Whereas the Southland, Perry, and Terminix decisions estab-
lished that the FAA prohibits state efforts to invalidate agreements
to arbitrate certain categories of disputes, Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto 2 went even further in expanding the scope of the FAA's
218
preemptive effect. In Casarotto, the Court held that even a mere
requirement that an arbitration clause be "typed in underlined
capital letters on the first page of the contract" was inconsistent
219with the FAA and therefore preempted.
210. 465 U.S. 1, 1 (1984).
211. Id. at 10.
212. 482 U.S. 483, 483 (1987).
213. See id. at 491-92.
214. 513 U.S. 265, 267 (1995).
215. See id. at 268-69.
216. See Dobson, 513 U.S. at 268.
217. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
218. Id. at 686.
219. See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 683; see also Sternlight, supra note 12, at 667.
Professor Sternlight's observations are that "[a]summing the Court's decision in
Doctor's Association is neither overturned by Congress nor later reversed as consti-
tutionally misguided, state legislatures will be permitted to protect consumers and
others from unfair binding arbitration clauses only to the extent they regulate
1998]
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The various approaches discussed in this section all have the
same essential objective: achieving a greater congruence between
arbitration outcomes and substantive legal principles. Each of
them - (1) making distinctions based on whether the rights in-
volved have statutory origins; (2) requiring arbitrators to follow the
law; (3) adopting policies and procedures to ensure a fair hearing;
(4) analyzing the issues in terms of "illegality" or amorphous
"public policy;" and (5) defaulting, finally to simplistic embrace of
the FAA's preemptive character - are merely fragments in a patch-
work effort to reconcile the irreconcilable and create the "Grand
Unified theory." They are not sufficient to deal effectively with the
kinds of emerging concerns discussed in Section IV.
IV. MORPHOGENESIS CONTINUED: CONSUMER AND NON-
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
The two primary paths of U.S. arbitration law development -
commercial and labor - have been haphazardly intersected by
new trails blazed by the courts through the legal wilderness, just as
hikers who become lost in the forest search first for the comfort of
a familiar path with which to join, despite a paucity of accurate in-
formation about its origin or destination.
A. Consumer Services Disputes
1. Health Care
Health care represents an area of rapid growth in service pro-
vider versus consumer arbitration programs. California-based Kai-
ser Permanente, the largest HMO in the country, requires sub-
scribers in its home state and three others to arbitrate claims
arising from their health care relationship. In Engalla v. Permanente
Medical Group, Inc., 22 a Kaiser patient and HMO subscriber brought
a claim for misdiagnosis and failure to treat respiratory conditions
that eventually proved to be terminal lung cancer.221 The patient
died the day after Kaiser's own arbitrator and a neutral arbitrator
222
were appointed. At trial, plaintiffs argued that Kaiser intention-
purely local transactions, or draft legislation that addresses arbitration jointly with
other concerns." Id. at 668.
220. 938 P.2d 903, 907 (Cal. 1997).
221. Seeid. at 908.
222. See id. The patient died 144 days after the demand for arbitration, thus
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ally delayed the appointment of a neutral arbitrator so as to reduce
its exposure, and that the system shows a pattern of delay.223 De-
spite the plan's own procedural rule which required appointment
of arbitrators within 60 days, the appointment process was actually
taking, on average, 674 days and claim resolution, on average, 863
days. 24 The trial court invalidated the arbitration agreement as
"unconscionable and a violation of public policy." 225 But the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that Engalla's claims were
subject to the arbitration agreement because no grounds existed
for rescinding it.226 The fact that the arbitration program "is de-
signed, written, mandated and administered by Kaiser" was of ut-
most significance in this case.227 "The fact that Kaiser has designed
and administers its arbitration program from an adversarial per-
spective is not disclosed to Kaiser members or subscribers."
228
Reversing the court of appeals, the California Supreme Court
found that the arbitration agreement was not facially unconscion-
able, 229 noting that "the alleged problem" was "the gap between
[Kaiser's] contractual representations and the actual workings of
its arbitration program." 23 The court went on to observe that it "is
the doctrines of fraud and waiver, rather than of unconscionability,
that most appropriately address this discrepancy between the con-
tractual representation and the reality." 231 Concluding that suffi-
cient evidence had been adduced to support a finding upholding
reducing the family's potential recovery by $250,000. See Kaiser Fields Pointed Ques-
tions from California Supreme Court Justices, 8 WORLD AR. & MEDIATION REP. 77-78
(1997).
223. See Engalla, 938 P.2d at 913.
224. Id. at913.
225. Id. at 915.
226. Id. at 908.
227. Id. at 909. The court found that under the program:
Kaiser collects funds from claimants and holds and disburses them as
necessary to pay the neutral arbitrator and expenses approved by him or
her. It monitors administrative matters pertinent to the progress of each
case, including, for example, the identity and dates of appointment of
arbitrators. It does not, however, employ or contract with any inde-
pendent person or entity to provide such administrative services, or any
oversight or evaluation of the arbitration program or its performance.
Rather, administrative functions are performed by outside counsel re-
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the Engallas' allegations, including the question of whether Kaiser,
by its delay or by other acts or omissions, waived its right to compel
arbitration, the court remanded the case to the trial court for reso-
2,32lution of these key factual issues. 21
In Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix, Ltd.,233 the Arizona
Supreme Court invalidated as an unenforceable contract of adhe-
sion a document denominated "Agreement to Arbitrate" signed by
a patient before undergoing a clinical abortion at defendant's facil-234
ity. The court observed that the adhesive nature of the agree-
ment was "not, of itself, determinative of its enforceability, 2 3 but
found that its provisions did not "fall within the reasonable expec-
tations of the weaker or 'adhering' party. The court focused on
four points: (1) Plaintiff Broemmer had been presented with the
"standardized contract" "offered on a 'take it or leave it' basis," as a
condition of treatment; 211 (2) the defendant medical facility,
drafter of the agreement, had "inserted additional terms poten-
tially advantageous to itself requiring any [A.A.A. appointed arbi-
trator to] be a licensed medical doctor specializing in obstet-
rics/gynecology;",238 (3) clinic staff neither explained the terms of
the agreement to plaintiff "nor indicated [to her] that she was free
to refuse to sign, telling her only that she "had to complete the
three forms; 23 and, (4) the [p]laintiff was under great emotional
stress, had only a high school education, was not experienced in
commercial matters," and was "still not sure 'what arbitration is.'24
Interestingly, the only reference to the Arizona version of the
UAA241 was in the dissent, which would have upheld the agreement




233. 840 P.2d 1013, 1014 (Ariz. 1992).
234. See id. at 1015.
235. Id. at 1016 (quoting Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 172
(1981)). "[A] contract of adhesion is fully enforceable according to its terms un-
less certain other factors are present which, under established legal rules -legisla-
tive or judicial - operate to render it otherwise." Id.




240. Id. at 1017.
241. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1501.
242. See Broemmer, 840 P.2d at 1019. The Supreme Court has upheld arbitra-
tion agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act in a variety of contexts. See,
e.g., Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 221 (1987)
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2. Banking
r • 243
In Badie v. Bank of America, the Appellate Department of the
California Superior Court decided, in an unpublished opinion
that: (1) that the contract between Bank of America and its retail
deposit account customers and credit card customers did allow
modifications which would include the addition of an arbitration
provision; (2) the modification to add the arbitration clause was ef-
fectively communicated by notices which the bank sent to custom-
ers, and (3) that the manner of delivery was sufficient to make the
communication effective. 24 Further, the court, ruled that this
modification did not violate the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.245
Although the Badie court determined that the contracts be-
tween the bank and its customers were contracts of adhesion, the
bank's modification to add the arbitration clause was not uncon-
scionable because both the clause and its provisions were within
the reasonable expectations of the bank's customers.246 The court
determined that there was no proof that the bank made any false
representation or nondisclosure or that it engaed in what could
be determined to be an unfair business practice.
B. Non-Collective Bargaining Agreement / Non-Securities Employment
Cole v. Burns International Security Services, addresses the need
for a more focused and analytical approach to the enforcement of
mandatory arbitration agreements and the judicial review of arbi-
tration awards. Cole arose out of the termination of the plaintiffs
employment as a security guard who had been employed by LaSalle
(dealing with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO claims); Rodriquez
de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 478 (1989) (dealing
with the Securities Act of 1933); and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 22 (1991) (dealing with Age Discrimination in Employment Act
claim).
243. No. 944916, 1994 WL 660730 (Cal. App. Dep't. Super Ct. Aug. 18,1994.)
244. See id. at * 1.
245. See id. The doctrine of good faith and fair dealing governs unilateral
modifications of contract terms. Id. Under the doctrine of Perdue v. Crocker Nat'
Bank, 702 P.2d 503 (Cal. 1985), the bank retained the unilateral right to change
the terms of the agreement which it entered into with its customers. Id.
246. See Badie v. Bank of America, No. 944916, 1994 WL 660730, at *1, (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. Aug 18, 1994).
247. See id.
248. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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249and Partners. In 1991, the defendant Burns took over LaSalle's
contract to provide security services at Union Station. 250 As a con-
dition of obtaining employment with Burns, all former LaSalle
employees were required to sign a "Pre-Dispute Resolution Agree-,,251
ment. The applicants first agreed that in any lawsuit brought by
"either party" related to "your recruitment, employment with, or
termination of employment" the plaintiff "agrees to waive his, her,
or its right to a trial by jury, and further agrees that no demand,
request or motion will be made for trial byjury."252 Second, should
the applicant "seek relief in court the Company may, within 60 days
of service of the complaint, at its option, require all or part of the
dispute to be arbitrated by one arbitrator in accordance with the
rules of the American Arbitration Association." Third, the "option
to arbitrate" was to be "governed" by the FAA, and was "fully en-
forceable." Fourth, the subject matter of the arbitration covered
"all matters directly or indirectly related to [the applicant's] re-
cruitment, employment or termination of employment by the
Company; including, but not limited to, claims involving laws
against discrimination... , but excluding Workers Compensation
Claims. ,253
The document advises that "[t] he right to a trial, and to a trial
by jury, is of value"; and further suggests, in bold type, that the ap-
254plicant might wish to consult an attorney before signing. Notably,
the agreement also lectures: 'YOU WILL NOT BE OFFERED
EMPLOYMENT UNTIL THIS FORM IS SIGNED AND
RETURNED BYYOU."
255
After he was terminated in October, 1993, Burns brought an
action in the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia, alleging: (1) racial discrimination and harassment; (2) re-
taliation for having written a letter of complaint regarding sexual
harassment of a subordinate employee by a Burns supervisor; and
(3) intentional infliction of emotional distress.256 Relying on the
pre-employment agreement, Burns moved to compel arbitration




253. Id. at 1469 (emphasis added).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See id. at 1469-70.
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and to dismiss plaintiff Cole's complaint. 57 Opposing the motion,
Cole argued that the pre-employment agreement was not covered
by the FAA, and that it was an unconscionable, unenforceable con-
tract of adhesion."5 The trial court rejected these arguments, dis-
missed the complaint and granted Burns' motion to compel arbi-
tration."'
The D.C. Circuit noted that the "heart of the problem in this
case" is the enforceability of conditions of employment which re-
quire individual employees to use arbitration in place of a judicial
forum when resolving statutory claims.2 60 The court also rejected
an argument that the FAA's exclusion of contracts of employment
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce should ex-
261empt Cole from having to arbitrate his claims.
The Cole Court upheld the arbitration agreement, with judi-
cially-imposed modifications. Clearly bothered by the potential for
injustice created by the employer's practice, it articulated a virtual
primer on the construction and application of agreements mandat-
ing the arbitration of disputes involving statutory employment
262rights. In an insightful observation, the court noted that:
[I]t is crucial to emphasize the distinction between arbi-
tration in the context of collective bargaining and manda-
tory arbitration of statutory claims outside of the context
of a union contract.... [B]ecause traditional labor arbi-
tration is so celebrated in the United States, it is easy for
the uninitiated to fall prey to the suggestion that the legal
precepts governing the enforcement and review of arbi-
tration emanating from collective bargaining should be
equally applicable to arbitration of all employment dis-
putes. This is a mischievous idea, one that we categorically
reject.
263
The court discussed the special nature and context of labor
257. See id. at 1470.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. Id. at 1472.
261. See id. at 1472. An in-depth examination of this issue, raised in various
other cases, is beyond the scope of this article. For a full discussion, see Stemlight,
supra note 12 (analyzing the history of the Federal Arbitration Act and its inter-
pretation). "Given the very different purposes, sources and dynamics of grievance
arbitration under collective agreements, that model cannot be imposed unques-
tioningly upon the post-Gilmer world of public-law arbitration." Id.
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arbitration, noting the essential reason for the great judicial defer-
ence accorded that process: "It is the arbitrator's construction [of
the collective bargaining agreement] which was bargained for; and
so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the con-
tract, the courts have no business overruling him because their in-
terpretation of the contract is different from his."2'
The D.C. Circuit expressed its view that "[t]he fundamental
distinction between [privately created] contractual rights... and
statutory rights, which are created, defined, and subject to modifi-
cation only by Congress and the courts, suggests the need for a
public, rather than private, mechanism of enforcement for statu-
tory rights."265  Aside from what the court referred to as this
"abstract" level of concern, it found the arbitration of "public law
issues" also "troubling ... because the structural protections inher-
ent" in labor arbitration are not present.266 Unlike the situation in
Cole, in which only the employer will be a "repeat player" in the ar-
bitration program, the status of both the union and employer as
regular participants in the process provides them with the same
267level of knowledge about arbitrator selection. Other "structural
concerns" addressed by the court in Cole included:
(1) Privacy---Privacy is not a concern in labor arbitration,
where the issues are rarely of concern to anyone other
than the parties; but public judicial redress of statutory
claims "creates binding precedent that prevents a recur-. . 268
rence of statutory violations.
(2) Fee Obligations-Unions participate in negotiating the
terms of labor arbitration agreements; in cases like Cole,
the individual contracts often are presented on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis, thus permitting employers to "structure
arbitration in ways that may systematically disadvantage
employees." An example of this danger, says the court,
would be a plan which requires employees to pay arbitra-
tion fees, "in order to discourage or prevent them from
bringing claims. 
269
264. Id. at 1474 (citing United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,




268. Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs. 105 F.3d 1465, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
269. Id. See also Alfred W. Blumrosen, Exploring Voluntary Arbitration of Indi-
vidual Employment Disputes, 16 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 249, 262 (1983).
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(3)Legal Issue Competence--Generally, labor arbitrators,
many of whom are not lawyers, do not engage "in the
same kind of legal analysis performed by judges. [They]
often cite to and rely on treatises... on leading cases...
without citing to subsequent lower courts or less publi-
cized cases .... [thus basing the decision] on broad stroke
principles to the exclusion of cases more analogous to the
claim being decided. Nor do arbitrators always analyze an
intentional discrimination case within the judicially ac-
cepted three-prong framework articulated by the Su-
preme Court in McDonnell Douglas."'27
In this connection, Judge Edwards cited his own paper, Arbitra-
tion of Employment Discrimination Cases presented at the 28th annual
Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators, which reported
that at least sixteen percent of arbitrators have never read any judi-
cial opinions involving Title VII; forty- nine percent do not read la-
bor advance sheets to keep abreast of developments under Title
VII; and of those arbitrators who have never read ajudicial opinion
on employment discrimination and who do not read advance
sheets, fifty percent nonetheless feel professionally competent to
decide legal issues in cases involving employment discrimination.
These concerns notwithstanding, the Cole court concluded that
Gilmer clearly established that "as a general rule, statutory claims
are fully subject to binding arbitration, at least outside of the con-
text of collective bargaining. 272 In an uncharacteristic display of
micromanagement, the court went on to note that Mitsubishi still
requires that "[t]he prospective litigant effectively may vindicate
[his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum... [thus
enabling] the statute [to] continue to serve both its remedial and
deterrent function."273 For support, the court declared,
"[o] bviously, Gilmer cannot be read as holding that an arbitration
agreement is enforceable no matter what rights it waives or what
burdens it imposes."
2 74
270. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1477-78. See also Green v. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
792 (1973).
271. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1478 (citing Harry T. Edwards, Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Cases: An Empirical Study, PROC. OF THE 28 TM ANNuAL MEETING OF THE
NAT'LACAD. OFARB. 59, 71-72 (1976)).
272. Cole v. Bums. Int'l Sec. Servs. 105 F.3d at 1477
273. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson-Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
637 (1985)).
274. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482 (citing Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision &
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Perhaps in an apparent effort to justify its conclusion that Gil-
mer required enforcement of the arbitration agreement in Cole, the
D.C. Circuit's holding mandates details of program interpretation
and administration. These details sound more like the provisions
of a consent decree than the determination of an appeal:
(1) An employee cannot be required as a condition of
employment to waive access to a neutral forum in which
statutory employment claims may be heard-for instance,
givin 6up the right to bring a Title VII claim in any fo-
rum.
(2) The arbitration arrangement must provide for neutral
arbitrators. The court specifically blessed the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) as the designated ap-
277pointment agency.
(3)The program must provide for more than minimal
discovery, must require a written award and must provide
for all of the types of relief that would otherwise be avail-
able in court. With unusual precision, the D.C. Circuit
specifically consecrated, as the approved antitoxin against
the unstable condition of statutory employment claim ar-
bitration, AAA Employment Arbitration Rule 7 (which
empowers arbitrator to order depositions, interrogatories,
document production or other discovery as "consider[ed]
necessary to a full and fair exploration of the issues in
dispute"); Rule 32(b) (a written award requires written
reasons therefore required); Rule 32 (c) (an arbitrator is
authorized to grant any remedy or relief "deem[ed] just
and equitable, including, but not limited to Nany remedy
or relief [available to the parties in] court.").
(4) The employee cannot be required to pay unreasonable
costs or any arbitrators' fees. In this regard, the Court
The Private Arbitration of Public Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 635, 644 (posing a
hypothetical example of an unenforceable agreement to arbitrate as one which
requires employees to waive their right to be free from Title VII-prohibited dis-
crimination)).
275. See id.
276. Id. (noting the Ninth Circuit's refusal in Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prod-
ucts Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1246-48 (9th Cir. 1994) to enforce an arbitration agree-
ment under which the employee waived remedies provided by federal statue and
shortened the statute of limitations for filing).
277. Cole v. Burns Intern. Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465, 1480 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
278. See id.
279. See id. at 1480-81.
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deemed as a good start AAA Rule 35 (initiating party must
pay $500 filing fee (subject to apportionment in the
award) and an administrative fee of $150 per hearing day
(with provision for hardship deferral or reduction); Rule
36 (expenses shared equally unless otherwise agreed or
ordered in award); and Rule 37 (arbitrator's compensa-
tion to be as agreed with the parties or, absent agreement,
as otherwise directed in the award); AAA to set arbitra-
tor's fee (but no provision for method of allocation of
fees.)280 Inasmuch as the only other Rule addressing the
question of arbitrators' compensation-Rule 32-also
fails to prescribe how such costs are to be allocated, the
Court simply decreed that "an arbitrator's compensation
,,281and expenses must be paid by the employer alone.
The court's efforts to reconcile the Gilmer mandated arbitra-
tion with its own detailed conception of a fair process is a reflection
of its concerns.
The opinion concludes that the employee cannot be required
to pay any part of the arbitrator's fees: "Under Gilmer, arbitration is
supposed to be a reasonable substitute for a judicial forum.",
82
Therefore, it would undermine Congress's intent to prevent em-
ployees who are seeking to vindicate statutory rights from gaining
access to a judicial forum and then require them to pay for the
services of an arbitrator when they would never be required to pay
283for a judge in court. Accordingly, the Court found that the AAA
rules did not meet this requirement, apparently because of their
284silence regarding the allocation of arbitrator's compensation.
Thus, the D.C. Circuit created a paradox: Gilmer required enforce-
ment of the Cole agreement, but the agreement by its terms did not
meet the D.C. Circuit's detailed standards for fairness.2 5 The solu-
tion was simple: by judicial fiat, rewrite the contract.
286
The court observed that "where a contract is unclear on a
point, an interpretation that makes the contract lawful is preferred
to one that renders it unlawful."2 87 Coupling this principle with the
280. See id. at 1480.
281. See id. at 1481.
282. By analogizing to court filing fees, the court determined that the AAA
administrative fees "are not problematic." Id. at 1484.
283. See id.
284. Id.
285. See id. at 1483 n.ll.
286. See id. at 1475.
287. Id. at 1485-86 (citing 1010 Potomac Assoc. v. Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc.,
19981
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rule that ambiguous contract provisions are construed against the
drafter, the court decided "[t] herefore, in order to uphold the valid-
ity of the parties' contract, we interpret the arbitration agreement be-
tween Cole and Bums as requiring Burns to pay all arbitrator's fees
in connection with the resolution of Cole's claim."
289
Finally, the court literally served notice by advising the parties
that in the D.C. Circuit arbitration awards emanating from a system
such as Burns' will be subject to judicial review:
The value and finality of an employer's arbitration system
will not be undermined by focused review of arbitral legal
determinations. Most employment discrimination claims
are entirely factual in nature and involved well-settled le-
gal principles .... As a result, in the vast majority of
cases, judicial review of legal determinations to ensure
compliance with public law should have no adverse im-
pact on the arbitration process. Nonetheless, there will
be some cases in which novel or difficult legal issues are
presented demanding judicial judgment. In such cases,
the courts are empowered to review an arbitrator's award
to ensure that its resolution of public law issues is cor-
rect.... Because meaningful judicial review of public law
issues is available, Cole's agreement to arbitrate is not un-
conscionable or otherwise unenforceable.290
The Cole opinion underscores the thesis of this article: laws re-
garding enforcement of arbitration agreements and judicial review
of awards must recognize the relevance of subject matter.
C. Intersections and Collisions
Setting aside for the moment all attempts, from whichever
philosophical camp, to rationally analyze these developments, it is
clear is that the process of decisional mutation we have reviewed
has produced a series of intersections and collisions between the
FAA and other policy considerations that illustrate the futility of
485 A.2d 199, 205 (D.C. 1984) (stating a contract "must be interpreted as a whole,
giving a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all its terms."); Vicki Bagley
Realty, Inc. v. Laufer, 482 A.2d 359, 366 (D.C. 1984); see also RESTATEMENT OF
CoNTRAcTs § 236 (1925). "It is also accepted that ambiguous provisions are con-
strued against the drafter of the contract." Id. at 1486.
288. Home Savings and Loan v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341, 347
(Utah 1991).
289. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1486 (emphasis added).
290. Id. at 1487 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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the search for a judicially created "Grand Unified Theory of Arbi-
tration Law."
1. The FAA, Collective Bargaining and Federal Legislation on
Employment Discrimination
The seminal "collision" case was Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co.,291 in which the Supreme Court dealt with the question of
whether the historical deference accorded to labor arbitration
should extend to a claim of race discrimination under Title VII of
292the Civil Rights Act of 1964. That case arose out of an em-
ployee's discharge for poor work performance. 29' His union filed a
grievance asserting that the discharge was without 'Just cause" as
required by the collective bargaining agreement.294 The claim that
the discharge also constituted race discrimination was not asserted
until the employee later filed a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. The race claim was heard and consid-
ered by the arbitrator, who rejected all the employee's and union's
296arguments and upheld the discharge. The employee then
brought a Title VII action in federal court, arguing that the adverse
arbitration decision should not preclude litigation of the race
claim. The Supreme Court held that the arbitrator's authority
was limited to the determination only of contractual claims created
by the collective bargaining agreement,298 and that the public policy
underlying Title VII mandated that the employee's statutory claim
was entitled to a de novo court hearing. The Court concluded
from the statute's legislative history that Congress intended to pre-
serve the right to judicial resolution of the statutory claim and that
the union could not waive this right in collective bargaining. °°
The Court observed in a footnote that the arbitration award could
be admitted as evidence in the discrimination suit and accorded• -301
the appropriate weight.
291. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
292. See id. at 38; see also 42 U.S.C.§ 2000 e-2 (1994).
293. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 36.
294. See id. at 39-40.
295. See id. at 42.
296. See id.
297. See id.
298. See id. at 43.
299. See id. at 59-60.
300. See id. at 51-52.
301. See id. at 60 n.21.
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The opinion distinguished Title VII rights from those other-
wise legally protected, noting that a "private litigant not only re-
dresses his own injury but also vindicates the important congres-
sional policy against discriminatory employment practices.
302
A recent three-way collision occurred at the intersection of the
FAA, federal employment discrimination statutes and the historical
principles governing the judicial review of labor arbitration awards.
On March 20, 1997, the Seventh Circuit decided Pryner v. Tractor
Supply Co. 303 and Sobierajski v. Thoesen Tractor &Equipment Co.30 4 In a
major break from the long line of Mitsubishi-inspired cases, 30 5 the
court concluded that when a doubt exists about the arbitrability of
a statutory discrimination claim the issue should be resolved in fa-
vor of the right to sue.3°r The court failed to even mention the op-
tion of "deferring to any strong federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion. " 7 It found the 1991 Civil Rights Act's new provision for jury
trials in Title VII cases to be a "strong expression of federal policy
that should be enforced.
3 03
In Pryner, the plaintiff employees invoked collective bargaining
agreement grievance U0ocedures after they were discharged by
their former employer. Asserting their employer's disciplinary ac-
tion was not for 'just cause," the employees maintained they were
discharged for reasons that would constitute violations of Title VII,
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA).31° One of the grievances was
abandoned by one employee.' When the remaining union griev-
302. Id. at 45 (citing Hutchings v. United States Ind., 428 F.2d 303, 310 (5"
Cir. 1970); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 715 (7"' Cir. 1969);
Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33 (5" Cir. 1968)). This essential con-
cept of "public policy" exceptions to FAA arbitrability has come under criticism.
See Stempel, supra note 2, at 285 (stating that "treating the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements disparately according to the nature of the dispute rather than the
quality of the parties' consent to the agreement constitutes judicial misuse of pub-
lic policy considerations and cheapens legitimate use of public values as an aid to
interpretation").
303. 109 F.3d 354 (7' Cir. 1997).
304. 679 N.E.2d 386 (Ill. 1997).
305. Which supported the FAA's establishment of a federal policy favoring ar-
bitration in almost every circumstance.
306. See Psyner, 109 F.3d at 365. See also 8 WoRLD ARn. & MEDIATION REP., No.
4, at 91 (1997).
307. 8 WoRLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP., No. 4, at 91 (1997).
308. Id.
309. See Pyynor, 109 F.3d at 354-55.
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ance could not be settled the other employee demanded arbitra-
tion." The court extensively discussed the conflict between the
union's role as advocate for the collective interests of all bargaining
unit employees and the individual employees' newly won right to
313
trial by jury of discrimination claims. It concluded that such em-
ployees' statutory rights could not be protected adequately in labor
arbitration, holding that "the union cannot consent for the em-
ployee by signing a collective bargaining agreement that consigns
the enforcement of statutory rights to the union-controlled griev-
ance and arbitration machinery created by agreement. "314 Echoing
the observations of the Ninth Circuit in Lai, the court concluded
that amendments to discrimination statutes encouraging the use of
ADR processes, including arbitration, were an expression of a pol-
icy favoring binding arbitration, only "where appropriate."315
2. The FAA, Collective Bargaining and The Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA)
The next collision was a three-way encounter between the tra-
ditional judicial deference shown to arbitration awards in the con-
text of collective bargaining, the FAA, and the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA) , 2 which sets minimum wages, requires premium
pay for overtime work and restricts child labor.
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., arose out of a
dispute between the employer trucking company and two of its
driver employees."" It was the employer's practice to require driv-
ers, upon arriving at the terminal to begin a trip, to punch in and
perform certain preliminary office work for which they were com-
pensated at an hourly rate. s3 9 Upon completion of these tasks, the
drivers were to punch out, locate their trucks, and conduct a re-
310
quired pre-trip safety inspection. If the vehicle passed, the driv-
ers commenced their hauls and were paid under a different com-
pensation scheme.3 However, if the truck failed the inspection,
312. See id.
313. See id. at 360-61.
314. Id. at 363.
315. Id. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
316. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994).
317. 450 U.S. 728, 728 (1981).
318. Seeid. at 731.
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the drivers were to take it to the company's repair shop and punch
in a second time. 322 Typically, 15 to 30 minutes elapsed between
drivers' punching out after finishing their office work and their
punching in a second time in the event of failed inspection. 3 23 It
was the company's practice not to compensate drivers for this block
of time. 3 4 Pursuant to the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement between the company and Teamsters Local 878, Lloyd
Barrentine and another driver filed a grievance against Arkansas-
Best.325 The grievance was heard by a joint grievance committee
consisting of three representatives of the union and three repre-
sentatives of the employer who, under the contract, acted as arbi-
trators to provide final and binding decisions.2 6 The grievance
committee rejected the drivers' claim that the time was compensa-
ble under the collective bargaining agreement.32 7 The employees
then brought a lawsuit seeking to recover compensation under the• • •328
overtime provisions of the FLSA. The key issue was whether the
action of the grievance committee required that the lawsuit should
be dismissed under the principles of claim preclusion.329 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
rendered judgment for the employer, the Eighth Circuit affirmed,
and certiorari was granted.
The Supreme Court observed that Barrentine's claim had
been for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, and held
that inasmuch as the authority of the joint committee was limited
to interpreting and applying the terms and provisions of that
agreement, it did not extend to an FLSA claim. Accordingly, the
332lawsuit was not barred. The Court noted two reasons why an
employee's right to a minimum wage and overtime pay under the
FLSA might be lost if submission of his wage claim to arbitration
precluded him from later suing in federal court: (1) even if the




325. See id. at 730.
326. See id. at 731.
327. See id.
328. See id. at 732-33.
329. See id. at 729-30.
330. See id. at 733-34.
331. See id. at 737.
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vigorously support it in arbitration, and (2) because arbitrators are
required to effectuate the intent of the parties, rather than to en-
force the statute, they could render awards inimical to the public
policies underlying the FLSA, thus depriving an employee of pro-. 333
tected statutory rights. In addition, the Court observed that arbi-
trators are often powerless to grant the broad range of relief avail-
able in federal court. 134 Rather, arbitrators are confined to
awarding only compensation authorized by the collective bargain-
ing agreement. 35  336
Fourteen years later, in Tran v. Alphonse Hotel Corp. the Sec-
ond Circuit considered the question of whether a union-
represented plaintiff who failed to exhaust the grievance and arbi-
tration procedure as the forum for his FLSA claims was for that
reason barred from bringing an action on those claims in federal
district court.33 7 Quoting extensively from Barrentine,338 the Court
held squarely that: "in so far as the wage hour claims of plaintiff are
concerned, plaintiff was not required to seek grievance and arbitra-
tion and was and is entided to have those claims considered on the
merits in the district court. " 39 Without discussion or explanation,
the Tran Court held that "[A] 11 claims of plaintiff other than those
stated under the FLSA should have been the subject of a timely
demand under the arbitration clause of the... union contract.
3 4
0
333. See id. at 742-43.
334. See id. at 745 (noting it is unlikely that an arbitrator will be authorized to
award liquidated damages, attorney's fees, or costs).
335. See id.
336. 54 F.3d 115, 115 (2d Cir. 1995).
337. See id. at 116-17.
338. 450 U.S. 728, 728 (1981).
339. Tran v. Tran, 54 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 1995). The plaintiff also sought
redress for alleged violations of certain state statutory and common law claims in
the district court. See id. The district court also refused to allow the plaintiff to
amend his complaint to state an additional claim under the Federal Labor Man-
agement Relations Act. See id. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994).
340. Tran, 54 F.3d at 118.
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3. The FAA, Collective Bargaining and The Civil Rights Act of
1871341
The Supreme Court dealt with still another policy intersection
and collision in McDonald v. City of West Branch. There, McDon-
ald, a police officer, brought an action in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging that his termination
from employment with the City violated the Civil Rights Act of
1871.3
As McDonald was a member of a collective bargaining unit, his
discharge was processed through the contractual grievance and ar-
bitration procedure. 344 The arbitrator upheld the discharge, find-
ing it was for just cause.35 McDonald then filed suit against the
City, the police chief and certain other officials, alleging that he
was discharged for exercising his First Amendment rights of free-
dom of speech, association and to petition the government for re-
dress of grievances.3s The jury rendered a verdict against the po-
lice chief alone, who appealed, arguing that the Federal Full Faith
and Credit Statute3 v required the arbitrator's decision to be ac-
corded res judicata and collateral estoppel effect and the suit dis-
missed.34 8 The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, and certiorari
was granted.3 9
Justice Brennan recalled the Court's rejection of both a judi-
cially-created rule of preclusion in Barrentine3 50 and a rule of defer-
ral in Gardner-Denver. Both decisions were essentially grounded
on the conclusion that the statutes at issue in those cases were in-
341. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Section 1983 provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
in law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of
this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. Id.
342. 466 U.S. 284, 284 (1984).
343. Id. at 285-86.
344. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 285-86 (1984).
345. See id. at 286.
346. See id.
347. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
348. See McDonald, 466 U.S. at 287.
349. See id. at 285.
350. Barentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 728 (1981).
351. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 36 (1974).
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tended by Congress "to be judicially enforceable and that arbitra-
tion could not provide an adequate substitute for judicial proceed-
ings..... ,352 The Court held that, inasmuch as there was a mis-
alignment of the interests of the union and of the employee, no
rule of preclusion should deprive McDonald of his right to sue on• • 353
a Section 1983 claim. This conclusion was driven by the Court's
observations that (1) the arbitrator lacked expertise in the substan-
tive statutory law; and (2) the arbitrator's authority, having been
derived solely from the contract, may not extend to the enforce-
ment of Section 1983. 54 Therefore, there was an imperfect align-
ment of the interests of the union and of the employee.
4. Other FAA Employment Rights "Collisions"
The collisions and intersections discussed above are merely
examples of numerous decisions which illustrate the incoherent
and inconsistent approach being used by the federal courts to at-
tempt to reconcile numerous important Congressionally enshrined
employment rights with their elevation of the FAA to a status it is
neither logically nor philosophically capable of holding. 55 Among
the other statutory rights involved in these cases are those created
by Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),356 the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO Act) 57"r ,- 358
and those discussed by Professor Stempel.
V. CONCLUSION: THE "ANDROMEDA STRAIN" REVISITED
Despite Professor Sternlight's lamentation regarding the Su-
preme Court's elevation of the FAA to its currently supreme status,
352. McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984) (citing Bar-
rentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740-46 (1981); Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56-60 (1974)).
353. See McDonald, 466 U.S. at 292.
354. See id. at 290.
355. Professor Sternlight has characterized the current federal policy favoring
arbitration as a judicially-created "myth," first enunciated by Justice Brennan in
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction, 460 U.S. 1, 1 (1983). See
Sternlight, supra note 12, at 660. A myth that has resulted in the eradication of
public policy exclusion. Id. at 668-72, Sternlight goes on to assert that the
"favored" process has now become the one "preferred" by the Supreme Court, a
development unsupported by legitimate policy arguments. Id. at 660-697. For a
contrary view, see Stempel, supra note 2, at 283-335.
356. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
357. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
358. See Stempel, supra note 2.
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the statute is in no danger of being declared heretical. 59 Neither
does the Court seem inclined to abandon all of the so-called
"public policy" exceptions to the enforcement of pre-dispute arbi-
tration agreements and the awards that are their by-product in fa-
vor of an "intent of the parties" test which Professor Stempel advo-
360
cates.
At this evolutionary stage of the judicial morphallaxis, the
courts cannot pull themselves out of this vortex of competing and
conflicting interests to re-focus on a coherent and consistent ap-
proach which realizes that subject matter matters. But the current
mutated state of the law should prompt Congress and state legisla-
tures to enact a wholesale revision of the FAA and UAA- and
there is a related historical precedent that can serve as a valuable
guide.
Arbitration dates back to the British Law Merchant, which had
a specialized set of rules that governed commercial disputes in
eleventh century England. ' Aside from the desire for speedy reso-
lution, the primary factor that motivated business people to volun-
tarily prefer and adhere to this system as an alternative to the
courts was the desire of merchants to have disputes resolved ac-
361cording to their own commercial customs and practices.
The arbitration process created in this context, however,
needed some substantive rules on which to act. The same lex merca-
toyrias6 is at the root of the family tree of the law of commercialtransactions we now call the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).364
359. See Sternlight, supra note 12, at 674.
360. See id.
361. See Stempel, supra note 2, at 270.
362. See id.
363. See Bank of Conway v. Stary, 200 N.W. 505, 508-09 (N.D. 1924) (defining
les mercatoria).
[Lex mercatoria is] a system of law that does not rest exclusively on the in-
stitutions and local customs of any particular country, but consists of cer-
tain principles of equity and usage of trade which general convenience
and a common sense ofjustice have established to regulate the dealings
of merchants and mariners in all commercial countries of the civilized
world. This... common law of merchants is of more universal authority
than the common law of England.
See id. at 508 (citations omitted).
364. The Uniform Commercial Code is an Act:
Relating to Certain Commercial Transactions in or regarding Personal
Property and Contracts and other Documents concerning them, includ-
ing Sales, Commercial Paper, Bank Deposits and Collections, Letter of
Credit, Bulk Transfers, Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading, other
Documents of Title, Investment Securities, and Secured Transactions,
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The UCC is the contemporarily restated and systematized expres-
sion of that collection of customs of the "international community
of merchants, shipowners, marine insurance underwriters, and
bankers of many countries" that formulated the essential law of
35documentary sales.
But the Law Merchant itself went into a confused state of mu-
tation as a result of its absorption by the official British Courts dur-
ing the late Eighteenth Century. This development produced a
renewed interest in commercial arbitration to escape the degrada-
tion of the old informal system's economy, efficiency, and expedi-
tion.
6 6
By 1893, the aggregation of common law and ex mercatoria was
reduced to statute in Great Britain.16 In the United States, the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) undertook a similar codification effort that eventually
resulted in drafting a number of uniform acts regarding commer-
cial law reformn 5t Unlike what has happened with judicial efforts
to create the Grand Unified Theory of Arbitration Law, the
NCCUSL's efforts produced a comprehensive, albeit not yet fully
369integrated, set of commercial law codes.
The updated and integrated re-codification we know today as
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) purports to deal with situa-
tions which may ordinarily arise in the handling of a commercial
including certain Sales of Accounts, Chattel Paper, and Contract Rights;
Providing for Public Notice to Third Parties in Certain Circumstances;
Regulating Procedure, Evidence and Damages in Certain Court Actions
Involving such Transactions, Contracts or Documents; to Make Uniform
the Law with Respect Thereto; and Repealing Inconsistent Legislation.
U.C.C. § 1-103 (1996).
"Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and
equity, including the law merchant... shall supplement its provisions." Id.
(emphasis added).
365. Susie A. Malloy, The Inter-American Convention On The Law Applicable To
International Contracts: Another Piece Of The Puzzle Of The Law Applicable To Interna-
tional Contracts, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 662, 690 n.130 (1995).
366. See id. at 691 nn.133-34 (noting the UCC began with the law of mer-
chants).
367. See id. at 691 n.133.
368. SeeJAMEsJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1
(3d ed. 1988).
369. See id. UNIF. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw (1896); UNIF. WAREHOUSE
RECEIPTS ACT (1906); UNIF. SALES AT 1906); UNIF. BILLS OF LADING ACT (1909);
UNIF. STOCK TRANSFER ACT (1918); UNIF. CONDITIONED SALES ACT (1918); UNIF.
TRUST RECEIPTS ACT (1933).
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transaction.7 Preparation of the UCC began in 1942 as a joint
project of the American Law Institute (ALl) and the NCCUSL.
In 1995, the NCCUSL appointed a Study Committee to look
372into revising the UAA for the first time in its 40-plus year history.
In the Spring of 1997, a 10-commissioner Drafting Committee
commenced its work. The Drafting Committee may well see its task
only as fine-tuning the mechanics of a statute designed simply to
provide for the specific enforcement of arbitration agreements and
awards. We have observed that in arbitration, subject matter is im-
portant. Perhaps the Committee should adopt a more ambitious
agenda by creating a new, comprehensive, and integrated
"Uniform Arbitration Code" (UAC), to be modeled after the UCC.
Rather than maintaining the current UAA format and focusing
the discussions on "issues" such as the arbitrability of disputes or
discovery procedures, we suggest the Drafting Committee use a dif-
ferent approach by organizing the new Code around transaction dy-
namics, in a way similar to the UCC. A few examples of the kinds of
dynamics and the types of concerns generated by four decades of
judicial morphallaxis are:
Dynamic Concern
Relative equality of Contracts of adhesion; where transaction
bargaining; power/ rela- avoidance is an unrealistic or impractical strat-
tionship dependency egy for avoiding arbitration agreement
Realistic availability of Purpose/role of legislative-created rights,
non-arbitration relief; op- causes of action, remedies; arbitrators following
tions available at the time the law
Asymmetry of infor- "Repeat players"; contracts of adhesion;
mation/sophistication/ re- knowing waiver; discovery; breadth or remedies;
sources/interests in a com- joinder of parties; class actions
plex society
Relatively essential na- Where transaction avoidance is unrealistic
ture of goods/services dealt or impractical (e.g., health care, banking, insur-
with by the contract con- ance, employment); public policy/trade regula-
taining the arbitration tion
agreement
370. See id. (discussing the scope of the Uniform Commercial Code).
371. See id. Between 1944 and 1951, the first draft of the code was completed.
Id.
372. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Uniform Law Commissioners Tackle The Uniform
Arbitration Act, THE NEUTRAL CORNER, Sept. 1997, at 5-6.
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Dynamic Concern




Relative pri- Statutory rights/remedies; interface with
vate/public impact/interest common law tort actions; public policies regard-
ing maintenance/creation of normative societal
expectations and actions; arbitrators following
the law
Arbitration as facilita- International versus domestic nature of
tive of important national transaction; interaction of commercial activity
commercial/economic ob- with foreign political and economic policy
jectives
Federalism balance: State regulation or arbitration; local cul-
national policy favoring ar- ture, values, politics
bitration versus States' in-
terest in regulating it
Relative signifi- Statutory rights; legislative regulation of
cance/intensiveness of fac- societal activities (e.g., employment, trade,
tual versus legal issues product liability); arbitrators following the law
Such an approach could help restore arbitration to its in-
tended status, as expressed in the classic definition quoted by Elk-
ouri and Elkouri:
[A] simple proceeding voluntarily chosen by the parties
who want a dispute determined by an impartial judge of
their own mutual selection, whose decision, based on the
merits of the case, they agree in advance to accept as final
and binding. 73
A failure by the Drafting Committee to position its activities in
a context of sufficient breadth and depth may well result in an un-
recoverable loss of those attributes that are its raison ditre - speed,
efficiency, economy, expertise, and finality. The Committee runs
the risk of overreacting to interest-groups and creating, not a valu-
able product of the Grand Unified Theory of Arbitration Law, but
a new kind of mutation, a cross between what many jurisdictions'
374call the "Rent-a-Judge" process and a watered-down litigation
373. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WoRKs 2 (3d
ed. 1982); See also Gater v. Ariz. Brewing Co., 95 P.2d 49, 50 (Ariz. 1939).
374. See, e.g., MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 114.02 (a)(2) (1997).
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procedure containing such features as artificially-constrained, one-
size-fits-none discovery and the right to appeal from a "reasoned
opinion."
But doing the right thing should come naturally to ten reflec-
tive commissioners. Interestingly enough, the Associate Chief Re-
porter of the Editorial Board which oversaw the preparation of the
1952 edition of the UCC was Professor Soia Mentschikoff-whose
other well-known area of expertise is arbitration.3 75 Thus, the
NCCUSL already has the cross-disciplinary ancestral genes for the
creation of the new species of arbitration law we advocate. Success
at this level may well pave the way for the development of a more
useful "Federal Code of Arbitration" (FCA) to supplant the now
obviously overly simplistic FAA.
Consensual Special Magistrate. A forum in which a dispute is presented to a neu-
tral third party in the same manner as a civil lawsuit is presented to ajudge. This
process is binding and includes the right of appeal.
See id.
375. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 368, § 1.
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